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The Criminal Justice Black Box
SAMUEL R. WISEMAN?
“Big data”—the collection and statistical analysis of numerous digital 
data points—has transformed the commercial and policy realms, 
changing firms’ understanding of consumer behavior and improving 
problems ranging from traffic congestion to drug interactions. In the 
criminal justice field, police now use data from widely dispersed 
monitoring equipment, crime databases, and statistical analysis to 
predict where and when crimes will occur, and police body cameras 
have the potential to both provide key evidence and reduce 
misconduct. But in many jurisdictions, digital access to basic criminal 
court records remains surprisingly limited, and, in contrast to the civil 
context, no lucrative market for the data (apart from that for 
background checks) exists to induce the private sector to step in to fill 
the gap. As a result, bulk criminal justice data is largely limited to 
survey data collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Unlocking the 
“black box” by uniformly collecting and reporting basic, anonymized 
data from criminal cases—including, e.g., the charges, pretrial 
release decision, appointment of counsel, and case disposition—would 
have significant benefits. It would allow researchers, reformers, and 
government actors to both more effectively study the system as a 
whole and to more easily identify jurisdictions violating the 
Constitution by, for example, routinely denying counsel or pretrial 
release and imprisoning defendants for inability (rather than 
unwillingness) to pay a fine or fee. This Article documents this 
problem, explores its causes, and proposes a solution, arguing that the 
federal government should form a framework for the uniform 
collection of anonymized local, state, and federal criminal justice 
data. While participation in this uniform system is likely to be 
incremental, even partial data would improve understanding of the 
system as a whole and aid efforts to enforce well-established, but 
frequently violated, constitutional rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We do not know exactly how many people in the United States are in jail 
or prison, what they were charged with, the charges for which they were 
convicted, how long they awaited trial in jail, and when and whether they had 
an attorney, among other basic data points. Yet we live in the era of so-called 
“big data.”1 If Google can digitize whole libraries of books2 and firms can 
track consumers’ every purchase and preference,3 the project of maintaining 
decent criminal justice statistics and posting them online seems elementary.
Indeed, big data—the collection and analysis of large amounts of raw 
information to identify or understand phenomena in a variety of fields4—has 
                                                                                                                     
1 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 6 (2013).
2 See id. at 83–84 (describing Google’s project, announced in 2004, to scan and 
digitize every book, and observing that by 2012, Google had electronically captured “more 
than 15 percent of the world’s written heritage”). 
3 Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1331 (2015) (describing how firms “collect and mine data from 
billions of transactions” and observe consumer preferences by filming consumers’
movements and the direction of their eye movements as they shop within stores). 
4 The term “big data” describes a variety of types of data collection and analysis. See, 
e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that in the 2000s, “[t]he 
sciences like astronomy and genomics . . . coined the term,” observing that “[t]here is no 
rigorous definition of bid data,” and defining the term as “things one can do at a large scale 
that cannot be done at a smaller one, to extract new insights or create new forms of value, 
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substantially changed how researchers, marketers, and policymakers approach 
problems. Thousands of terabytes5 of electronic data have been scraped, 
coded, and run through countless statistical programs6 to identify and analyze 
trends and suggest a targeted fix, such as improving the operation of the 
electrical grid, identifying dangerous drug interactions, and reducing traffic 
congestion.7 More than a decade ago, Professor Daniel Esty noted how 
electronic data had already begun to transform environmental decision
making, with electronic technologies making the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of emissions and toxicology data less costly and far more 
effective.8
Twelve years and much technological progress later, the same cannot be 
said for crucial aspects of the criminal justice system. Collection and analysis 
of bulk data has been employed in parts of the system. Police now use 
aggregated law enforcement databases, extensive monitoring equipment, and 
                                                                                                                     
in ways that change markets, organizations, the relationship between citizens and 
governments, and more”); Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 
539–42 (2014) (explaining that the term “refers to a new method of empirical inquiry,”
including “practices that become more useful as electronic data recorded from devices and 
services grows,” and that big data allows the development of hypotheses after, rather than 
before, the collection of empirical evidence); Paul Ohm, Response, The Underwhelming 
Benefits of Big Data, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 339, 339–40 (2013) (describing big data 
as “the trendy moniker for powerful new forms of data analytics,” and noting that the term 
has “become nearly synonymous with ‘data analysis’”); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. 
King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 42 (2013) (“Big data 
analytics depend on small data inputs, including information about people, places, and 
things collected by sensors, cell phones, click patterns, and the like. These small data 
inputs are aggregated to produce large datasets which analytic techniques mine for 
insight.”).
5 See, e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that in 2013 
there were approximately 1,200 exabytes of stored information, only 2% of which was not 
digitized). 
6 See, e.g., id. at 2 (describing how Google explored 50 million common search 
terms used by Americans in order to identify areas of likely flu outbreak); id. at 4 
(describing a big data project in which the researcher scraped 12,000 airline ticket prices 
from a 41-day period). 
7 Id. at 2 (describing a Google big data study and resulting model that appeared to be 
superior to the Center for Disease Control’s techniques in terms of identifying areas of flu 
outbreak); Mattioli, supra note 4, at 540–44 (describing a big data drug interaction study); 
Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 245–51 (2013) (providing anecdotal 
accounts of these benefits and other applications). But see Ohm, supra note 4, at 340–43 
(observing that it does not appear that Google’s flu outbreak tool has been applied in a 
beneficial manner—such as to prevent individuals from traveling to areas with full 
outbreaks—and that many other supposed big data successes lack proof of beneficial 
application). 
8 Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 115, 156, 162 (2004). 
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complex models to project where and when crimes will occur.9 But the 
benefits of data mining remain largely inaccessible to criminal justice 
reformers, policymakers, and academics—as well as judges and police that 
make the bulk of the decisions within the criminal justice system—because the 
data is not available to be mined. This is true even though the systems in place 
for arresting, detaining, trying, imprisoning, and releasing criminal defendants,
in thousands of jurisdictions across the United States, are, in many ways, ideal 
targets for bulk data analytics. Millions of individuals are cycled through 
systems with common data points, such as the list of charges for each 
defendant; whether and when counsel were appointed, and why or why not; 
whether the individual was released on bail or held while awaiting trial; the 
length of pretrial imprisonment; the final disposition; and the terms of any 
sentence imposed. These types of data—which in many cases are already 
collected and recorded by some courts, but not electronically available in bulk 
format—could be anonymized and used to improve our understanding of the 
system as a whole.10
A recent in-depth analysis of Florida sentencing by the Sarasota Herald-
Tribune showing that African-Americans receive significantly longer 
sentences than white defendants for similar crimes demonstrates both the 
potential of big data approaches and the limitations of existing datasets.11 The 
paper’s investigative team reviewed “tens of millions of documents contained 
in two public record databases” in order to “compare sentences handed down 
by judges based on the points that defendants scored under Florida’s
sentencing guidelines.”12 As the paper explained, however, collecting the 
necessary data was an onerous task:
It took editors and reporters years to learn how to use the Offender Based 
Transaction System, and we only got to that point with help from the Tampa 
Bay Times.
                                                                                                                     
9 Michael Endler, NYPD, Microsoft Push Big Data Policing into Spotlight, DARK 
READING (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.darkreading.com/risk-management/nypd-microsoft-
push-big-data-policing-into-spotlight/d/d-id/1105879?page_number=1 [https://perma.cc/8
MGD-ZSYU] (describing New York City’s Domain Awareness System); Mark van 
Rijmenam, The Los Angeles Police Department Is Predicting and Fighting Crime with Big 
Data, DATAFLOQ (Apr. 14, 2016), https://datafloq.com/read/los-angeles-police-department-
predicts-fights-crim/279 [https://perma.cc/CB5S-ZHHW]. For descriptions of similar 
efforts by police departments around the country, see Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by 
Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 42–48 (2014).
10 Cf. Esty, supra note 8, at 132 (noting the value of bulk data in terms of identifying 
problems and that “[i]n the environmental domain there is often a great deal of uncertainty 
about whether a problem even exists”).
11 Josh Salman et al., Florida’s Broken Sentencing System, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.
(Dec. 11, 2016), http://projects.heraldtribune.com/bias/sentencing/ [https://perma.cc/AW4
C-P66G].
12 Michael Braga, How We Did It, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., http://projects.heraldtrib
une.com/bias/how-we-did-it/ [https://perma.cc/CG8U-FTJS].
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Compiled by Florida’s court clerks, OBTS is a giant and unwieldy 
repository that tracks every criminal case from arrest through appeal.
. . . .
OBTS contains multiple entries for each defendant and crime, and all the 
duplicate entries had to be removed before meaningful analysis was possible. 
After scrubbing the database, we were ready to start reporting in April. 
But it wasn’t long before we ran into another complication.
. . . .
Defendants . . . might receive longer sentences because of more prior 
convictions or they carried guns during robberies.
OBTS allows the user to correct for that weakness. It contains a field 
called “Sentence Special,” which identifies cases involving aggravating 
factors — such as extensive criminal histories and the use of a gun — that 
lead to longer sentences. We eliminated all such cases.
But court clerks do not enter the data in the “Sentence Special” field the 
same way in every county. So it is not always possible to get clean 
comparisons between two people charged with the same crime.
The Herald-Tribune overcame that limitation by using a second set of 
records compiled by the Florida Department of Corrections.13
The Herald-Tribune’s effort is impressive, but the problems with data 
access and availability its researchers had to overcome are both typical and 
daunting. Thus, scholars, advocacy groups, and government officials often rely 
on survey data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.14 These surveys, while 
extremely valuable, are limited in scope and frequency.15 As a result, we do 
not know exactly how many inmates are detained at any given time, what they 
were charged with, the length of time between the charge and a verdict or plea, 
and numerous other data points that one might assume are readily available.16
Improving the quality of—and access to—bulk data could thus open new 
avenues of research like that conducted by the Herald-Tribune, but bulk data 
could also be used to identify likely systemic constitutional violations at the 
                                                                                                                     
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
15 As to frequency, see, for example, Data Collection: State Court Processing 
Statistics (SCPS), BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=2
82#Publications_and_products [https://perma.cc/RTY3-X9GM], noting that data was 
collected biennially between 1988 and 2006 and then again in 2009, which is the last 
survey for which data is available. As to scope, see infra note 16.
16 As discussed infra Part II, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) collects extensive 
data on the number of individuals held in jail or supervised outside of jail, inmate 
mortality, and other data, although it often provides this data as a national compilation. See, 
e.g., TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248629, JAIL INMATES 
AT MIDYEAR 2014, at 1–9 (June 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2L8D-2NTX]. BJS also sometimes provides data on a state-specific but 
not county-specific level. See infra notes 49, 91, 94, and 166–67 and accompanying text 
(discussing other Bureau of Justice Statistics surveys and survey-based reports).
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local level.17 A jurisdiction, for example, with a high poverty rate but a low 
rate of appointed counsel may be violating the Sixth Amendment, while a 
jurisdiction that indiscriminately imposes burdensome conditions of pretrial 
release may run afoul of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.18
Recent news reports,19 lawsuits,20 and scholarship21 call attention to 
seemingly widespread violations of well-established constitutional rights 
                                                                                                                     
17 Cf. Esty, supra note 8, at 133–34 (noting that, in the environmental context, the 
ability of bulk electronic data and analysis to identify the cause of environmental problems 
and the impact of these problems on particular populations or environments). 
18 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, 
at *10 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (“Any bail or bond scheme that mandates payment of pre-
fixed amounts for different offenses to obtain pretrial release, without any consideration of 
indigence or other factors, violates the Equal Protection Clause.”), vacated by, No. 16-
10521, 2017 WL 929750 (11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2017); Thompson v. Moss Point, No. 
1:15cv182LG-RHW, 2015 WL 10322003, at *1 (S.D. Miss., Nov. 6, 2015) (order granting 
declaratory judgment) (“No person may, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . , be held in custody after an arrest because the person is too 
poor to post a monetary bond.”); Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15cv34-MHT, 2015 WL 
5387219, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015) (finding that jailing someone “because she was 
too poor to pay a small amount of bail money” violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments); Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15-cv-570-HEA, 2015 WL 10013006,
*2 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015) (describing a settlement, in which a city promised that “no 
person will be denied pretrial release because of their individual inability to make a 
monetary payment,” which arose as a result of an Equal Protection lawsuit).
19 See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, A Life That Frayed as Bail Reform Withered, N.Y. TIMES
(June 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/nyregion/after-a-shocking-death-a-
renewed-plea-for-bail-reform-in-new-york-state.html [https://perma.cc/LPP9-2GER] 
(describing the death of Kalief Browder, who was jailed pretrial, for a long period of time, 
for a nonviolent crime that he repeatedly stated he did not commit); Sarah Stillman, Get
Out of Jail, Inc., NEW YORKER (June 23, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/201
4/06/23/get-out-of-jail-inc [https://perma.cc/2HNT-GLNJ] (describing the problem of 
debtors’ prison). 
20 Walker, 2016 WL 361612, at *10; Jones, 2015 WL 5387219, at *1 (showing class 
action and individual lawsuits addressing pretrial detention of defendants who could not 
afford money bail); Verified Complaint at 6–7, Miller v. Deal, No. 2011CV198121 (Ga. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011). 
21 See, e.g., Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense 
Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2013) (documenting the continuing, widespread 
failure to provide counsel to indigent defendants and relying primarily on studies that 
conducted surveys and collected data to provide average estimates of expenditures on 
indigent defense but did not document the number of defendants who qualify for but do not 
receive indigent defense); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be 
Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1352–54 (2014) (describing the frequent jailing of 
nondangerous defendants pretrial using the available statistics, which are primarily 
produced from Bureau of Justice Statistics surveys rather than bulk, raw data and systemic 
analysis of those data); Ann K. Wagner, Comment, The Conflict over Bearden v. Georgia
in State Courts: Plea Bargained Probation Terms and the Specter of Debtors’ Prison, 2010 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 383, 384–85 (describing the problem of debtors’ prison). For the studies, 
see, for example, NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE 
DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
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within the system—both before, during, and after trial—and all have had to 
rely primarily on anecdotal evidence. “Debtors’ prisons,” in which individuals 
are imprisoned for a failure to pay court costs associated with probation, child 
support, or other required fees, appear to be a common phenomenon,22 but 
identifying the most problematic individual jurisdictions remains a largely 
local endeavor.23 Further, it appears that indigent individuals in some 
jurisdictions are routinely denied counsel at critical stages;24 this is a problem 
that could be identified by sifting through docket-level data, but because much 
of the data is not available electronically, it must be discovered through 
haphazard (and costly) local investigation.25 In the bail context, the death of 
Kalief Browder, while awaiting trial for a crime that he did not commit, called 
attention to the months—even years—individuals who cannot afford bail sit in 
jail awaiting trial.26 Yet, we do not know which jurisdictions hold individuals 
for the longest periods of time, or which jurisdictions tend to imprison the 
most defendants simply because these defendants, many of whom are not 
dangerous, cannot afford the bail amount imposed.27 As a result, in part, of 
                                                                                                                     
85–89 (Apr. 2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M945-2GKC], which provides examples of indigent defendants for 
whom a court failed to appoint counsel or appointed counsel too late but does not indicate
the percentage or number of defendants nationwide for whom counsel was denied or 
provided too late. 
22 See, e.g., Stillman, supra note 19 (providing anecdotal accounts of the problem).
23 See, e.g., Verified Complaint, supra note 20, at 5 (regarding individuals who were 
jailed for a failure to pay child support in a class action, relying largely on news articles to 
document these cases of debtors’ prison); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM 
PROBATION: AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 10–11 (2014), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0214_ForUpload_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
67AB-KFZW] (relying primarily on seventy-five interviews, visits to county and 
municipal courts and open records requests sent to these courts, media and literature 
reviews, and conversations with private probation firms to document the problem of 
debtors’ prison).
24 See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal 
Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1031–36 (2006) (collecting anecdotes of 
counsel appointed too late in cases around the country and describing numerous reports’
conclusions that indigent defendants are not consistently receiving adequate defense).
25 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 195–96, 213 (2008) (describing as 
“routine” a hearing required by Texas law in which the defendant is “formally apprised” of 
the charges against him, bail is set, and the defendant is jailed if he cannot afford bail, and 
how a county did not provide counsel to indigent defendants at this stage—a practice that 
the Supreme Court determined was unconstitutional); Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 
S.W.3d 137, 156–57 (Tex. 2012) (describing a routine failure to appoint counsel for 
indigent defendants).
26 See Dwyer, supra note 19.
27 The available statistics in this area tend to be national statistics based on Bureau of 
Justice Statistics surveys and estimates by other national groups. See, e.g., THOMAS H.
COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 214994, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF 
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 1 (Nov. 2007), http:// bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pu
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these types of data limitations, the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division 
had to conduct a twenty-month investigation to identify apparent racial bias in 
Ferguson, Missouri’s juvenile justice system.28 Knowledge of systemic 
problems in similar systems around the country remains underdeveloped.29
The potential applications for improved criminal justice data are 
numerous, and there is increasing recognition of the importance of data and 
statistics in criminal justice reform efforts. The President’s 2015 budget 
included improved collection of information on “public defender agencies, 
programs and operations,” recidivism rates, inmates in prisons and jails, and 
state criminal data, among other types of information.30 The President’s Task 
Force on 21st Century Policing has launched a “Police Data Initiative,” in 
which twenty-one cities and counties are attempting to improve and unify the 
data collected and recorded through many different computer systems in each 
jurisdiction to support better analysis of problems and develop policing “best 
practices.”31 Further, the Federal Bureau of Justice Statistics collects data on 
defendant deaths in custody, including deaths during arrests, although it is 
only voluntarily provided by law enforcement agencies and thus only available 
for limited jurisdictions.32 The goal is to “gain a national picture of police use 
of force” and to “incentivize the systematic and transparent collection and 
analysis of use of force incident data at the local level.”33
Nonetheless, the development of usable data, particularly post-arrest data, 
has been slow. The failure to make available these basic, widely collected data 
                                                                                                                     
b/pdf/prfdsc.pdf [https://perma.cc/75ZX-PNCK] (noting that five out of six defendants 
detained before trial could not afford the bail set in their case, based on a survey of state 
courts and pretrial services agencies in forty of the seventy-five largest counties);
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT 2,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_justice/spip_handout
s.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWE8-AJZW] (“Two thirds of the 500,000 
individuals incarcerated in jail and awaiting trial are low bail risk, meaning they have been 
deemed by a magistrate to pose no significant risk to themselves or the community, as well 
as representing a low risk of flight.”). 
28 CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE ST. LOUIS 
COUNTY FAMILY COURT ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI (July 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/
641971/download [https://perma.cc/U92K-55J7].
29 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., FISCAL 
YEAR 2015: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 294 (2015),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2015-PER/pdf/BUDGET-2015-PER.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/SS2F-GRKP].
30 Id. 
31 Megan Smith & Roy L. Austin, Jr., Launching the Police Data Initiative, WHITE 
HOUSE (May 18, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/05/18/launching-police-
data-initiative [https://perma.cc/YKL8-HWFW].
32 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT 21–22 (May 
2015), http://www.policemag.com/resources/documents/21stcpolicingtaskforce-finalreport
.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCL7-78FV].
33 Id. at 22. 
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sources arises, in large part, from a lack of adequate incentives.34 Unlike the 
law firms that pay Westlaw and LexisNexis large sums to access those 
databases, and that collect docket-level data on their own,35 the entities that 
would use these statistics tend to be underfunded nonprofit groups,36 indigent 
criminal defendants,37 and academics.38 Individual jurisdictions, moreover, 
may be hesitant to expose the workings of their court systems in order to avoid 
unwanted attention.39 Criminal justice data, then, is an underproduced public 
good,40 and further41 government intervention is needed. The federal 
government, or individual states operating under federal guidance for the 
uniform production and reporting of information, must step in to incentivize or 
mandate the production and online posting of basic criminal justice data.
This Article identifies the problem of the black box of criminal justice 
data,42 explores the reasons behind it, and proposes solutions. Part I explores 
                                                                                                                     
34 See infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.
35 See infra Part III.A.
36 See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S
NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 6–8 (Oct. 2010), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_doc
ument/InForAPenny_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RC7-Z9HB] (describing problems in a 
variety of states based on surveys and interviews); Ending the American Money Bail 
System, EQUAL JUST. UNDER L., http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/current-cases/ending-
the-american-money-bail-system/ [https://perma.cc/59KM-33DY] (describing class action 
lawsuits filed by the group in U.S. district courts in an attempt to end money bail on a case-
by-case basis).
37 See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 212–13 (2008) (reviewing an 
indigent defendant’s challenge to the denial of counsel by a county court at a critical stage); 
Lucas, supra note 21, at 1199–200 (noting that to address the indigent defense crisis, “legal 
advocates have generally based litigation reform efforts on the Sixth Amendment” using 
post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claims or “civil class-action lawsuits”). 
38 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 21, 1351–63 (documenting the problematic effects 
of money bail and pretrial detention relying on nationally available summary data and 
limited examples from states and counties); Wagner, supra note 21, at 391–94
(documenting the problem of debtors’ prisons largely through anecdotal evidence); see also 
Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the 
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1302 (2012) (same); Shima Baradaran, 
The State of Pretrial Detention (same), in THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2011, at 187, 
190 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2011).
39 See infra notes 244–49 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 236–39 and accompanying text. 
41 As introduced above and discussed further below, the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
already collects large amounts of data in survey form from the seventy-five largest counties 
and the federal courts, as well as from public defender agencies, but this data is not 
provided on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis and lacks the types of data points needed to 
identify what this Article identifies as some of the most pressing criminal justice issues. 
See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text; infra notes 104–06, 173–99 and 
accompanying text. 
42 This is the first Article to identify the criminal justice data “black box.” Other 
scholars have used this term to describe certain aspects of the system. See Pamela Metzger 
& Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2015) 
(“[P]ublic defense remains a largely data-less enterprise, a black box of discretionary 
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the areas in which bulk criminal justice data would be most valuable and the 
groups that could benefit from its availability, describing how academics, 
policymakers, nonprofit groups, judges, and police could identify systemic 
violations of well-established constitutional rights in the criminal justice 
system and focus improvement efforts on jurisdictions with the highest 
violation of rights. Part II then documents the current gaps in available 
information and explores the factors that likely lead to the underproduction of 
data.
After identifying the problem and its likely causes, Part III of this Article 
calls for an improved data collection system in which county and state dockets 
contain basic, uniform information points, such as demographic data including 
the age, race, and gender of the defendant; the type of charge; date of the 
charge; whether or not counsel was appointed, date of appointment, and reason 
for the appointment or failure to appoint; date of the bail hearing; pretrial 
release conditions imposed if the defendant was released; days spent in pretrial 
detention if the defendant was jailed; whether or not the defendant appeared 
for trial or committed crimes pretrial; hearings scheduled and held; and the 
type of adjudication (plea, trial, or diversion, for example). Part III also 
explores models from which this data collection system could build, analyzing 
the benefits and drawbacks of existing state and federal efforts to unify 
criminal justice data collection.
Finally, in Part IV, this Article identifies and responds to likely objections,
including the cost of collecting and posting online criminal justice data for 
millions of defendants and concerns about defendants’ privacy. The fact that 
many dockets already contain much of the information that this Article calls 
for, and that many are electronically available in courthouses, yet are simply 
not posted online, suggests that the improved system would not be 
prohibitively costly.43 Further, much of the data currently provided for a fee 
from the service Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)44 does 
not appear to require the funds generated by PACER. Courts often use PACER 
revenues to fund courtroom technologies and other activities unrelated to the 
dissemination of information about county and state cases.45 Further, while 
privacy concerns are legitimate and must be carefully addressed, data entry 
systems could be designed to exclude or redact defendant names, addresses, 
and other personal identifying characteristics,46 and the computer systems 
                                                                                                                     
decisions disconnected from any systemic analysis about the relationship between defender 
practices and case outcomes.”).
43 See PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ZZF8-ZRAD].
44 Id.
45 Stephen Schultze, What Does It Cost to Provide Electronic Public Access to Court 
Records?, MANAGING MIRACLES (May 29, 2010), http://managingmiracles.blogspot.com/2
010/05/what-is-electronic-public-access-to.html [https://perma.cc/GRQ8-69YZ]; infra note 
242 and accompanying text. 
46 See, e.g., Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository, IDAHO ST. JUDICIARY,
https://www.idcourts.us/repository/start.do [https://perma.cc/5Y5U-NDES] (describing 
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could automatically screen for and delete, or otherwise black out, these types 
of data as a backstop measure.
II. THE USES OF BULK CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA
The empirical analysis of bulk criminal justice data has produced 
promising results in the limited contexts where it can currently be employed,47
but broader applications are hampered by a lack of access to the necessary 
information. The American criminal justice system involves thousands of 
local, state, and federal officials who arrest, detain, or release on bail, 
imprison, sentence, and establish parole conditions for millions of defendants.
This multiplicity of systems makes collecting and analyzing uniform data 
across jurisdictions difficult—but, due to the dramatic, technology-driven fall 
in the costs of storing and disseminating information, no longer an insuperable 
challenge. Making existing information from local, state, and federal courts’
criminal dockets and case summaries electronically available and 
standardizing data points within dockets to ensure uniformity could trigger 
meaningful change in the criminal justice system at both the national and local 
levels. This Part discusses the substantive areas of the system where improved 
data and analysis could have significant impacts and the ways in which the 
data could be used by different groups to study national issues and identify 
problems at the state and local levels. 
A. Data and Systemic Problems
Currently, criminal justice researchers have to either rely on limited survey 
data or engage in the costly, cumbersome task of collecting and coding more 
complete data sets from a patchwork of federal, state, and local systems.48 In 
the absence of available bulk data, researchers frequently rely on sample data 
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). Professors Shima Baradaran and 
Frank McIntyre, for example, studied 116,000 observations of felony 
defendants from BJS State Court Processing Statistics in forty49 out of the 
seventy-five largest U.S. counties over a sixteen-year period.50 They included 
numerous data points for each defendant, such as “initial crime committed, 
any subsequent bail crime, and the prior record of the defendant, including any 
                                                                                                                     
Idaho courts’ omissions of personal identifying data in their electronic system that collects 
criminal defendant arrest, bail, and case disposition information).
47 See infra notes 49–50, 59–61, 67–68 and accompanying text. 
48 See supra notes 9–29 and accompanying text.
49 State Court Processing Statistics, 1990-2009: Felony Defendants in Large Urban 
Counties (ICPSR 2038), ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/2038
[https://perma.cc/4X7C-AC72].
50 Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 
524–25 (2012).
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failures to appear in court,”51 demographic characteristics, and pretrial crimes 
committed. They then used this and other data to construct a model for better 
predicting the dangerousness of defendants based on certain defendant data,
such as the prior record.52 Professors Baradaran and McIntyre concluded that,
if judges used their model for predicting dangerousness and thus for 
determining who should be detained pretrial, 25% more defendants could be 
released than are currently released, and pretrial crime rates would decline.53
But survey data is limited both in content and scope. The data from the 
forty counties used in the Baradaran-McIntyre study includes only a limited 
time window within each survey year,54 and it does not include information 
such as each “defendant’s community ties, employment status, income . . . and 
mental health status” due to “cost and data accessibility.”55 Further, the system 
“cannot distinguish defendants released under conditions that involve intensive 
pretrial monitoring from defendants released under less stringent pretrial 
conditions.”56 And raw BJS data is not readily available online. Researchers 
are required to obtain approval from their supervising institution and work 
with the BJS to obtain it.57 Researchers who need data not collected by the 
BJS must either give up or attempt the time-consuming task of assembling 
their own datasets.58
In an effort somewhat similar to McIntyre’s and Baradaran’s—but which 
involved somewhat more detailed digging into primary data—the Laura and 
John Arnold Foundation hired leading criminal justice researchers to identify 
“1.5 million cases drawn from more than 300 U.S. jurisdictions,” a dataset that 
was then narrowed to 746,525 defendants that had been released pretrial.59
These researchers then identified combined information about these 
                                                                                                                     
51 Id. at 525 (“Every two years, the ten largest U.S. counties are automatically 
surveyed, as are thirty other counties drawn from the next sixty-five largest counties.”).
52 Id. at 528.
53 Id. at 558.
54 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DATA ADVISORY: STATE 
COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS DATA LIMITATIONS (Mar. 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/conte
nt/pub/pdf/scpsdl_da.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z5P-U6NV].
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See State Court Processing Statistics, 1990-2009: Felony Defendants in Large 
Urban Counties (ICPSR 2038), supra note 49 (showing “[n]o downloadable data files 
available” for datasets and requiring an online application for data access). The BJS has 
good reasons for not posting all of the raw data, including concerns about defendant 
confidentiality and concerns that data users could draw the wrong conclusions from data 
and publish misleading results. Indeed, the BJS is careful to emphasize the lessons that 
cannot be produced from its data, noting that the data cannot show “the efficacy of one 
form of pretrial release over another” or the “effectiveness of a particular program in 
preventing pretrial misconduct.” BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 54.
58 See, e.g., infra notes 59–80 and accompanying text.
59 LJAF, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 3 (Nov. 
2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF-research-
summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7VZ-37LS].
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defendants, such as prior criminal records, with information on whether the 
defendants committed a crime while released before trial or failed to appear 
before trial, studying “hundreds of risk factors” that might best predict flight 
and pretrial crime.60 They ultimately identified nine risk factors that had the 
strongest predictive force,61 and the foundation used this information to create 
a nationally applicable model that all jurisdictions could use to best predict 
risk and to avoid detaining defendants with low risk factors.62 All counties in 
Kentucky began using the foundation’s model in 2013, and in the first six 
months of use, the state increased its release of defendants from 68% of 
defendants released to 70%, and pretrial crime declined by 15%.63 The 
foundation also believes that the Kentucky results so far show that the tool is 
“racially neutral and gender neutral” in that “[i]t accurately classifies 
defendants’ risk levels regardless of their race or gender.”64 Since Kentucky’s
adoption of the tool, more than nineteen other cities, counties, and states have 
adopted the tool, including some of the most populous cities.65 This laudable 
effort demonstrates the potential for data analysis to improve criminal justice, 
but it also shows how daunting the task of collecting criminal justice data can 
be. This effort would not have been possible without the generous funding of 
the foundation, which was formed by a billionaire couple.66
In the habeas context, Professor Nancy King and two experts with the 
National Center for State Courts conducted an extensive empirical analysis of 
habeas litigation in U.S. district courts.67 The goal of the authors was to 
identify success rates in habeas corpus cases filed by state prisoners under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, with a purpose of 
informing policymakers, litigants, courts, and scholars.68 State prisoners file 
more than 18,000 habeas cases annually, and approximately 6,000 of these 
                                                                                                                     
60 Id.
61 Id. at 3–4. 
62 Id. at 4.
63 More than 20 Cities and States Adopt Risk Assessment Tool to Help Judges Decide 
Which Defendants to Detain Prior to Trial, LJAF (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/more-than-20-cities-and-states-adopt-risk-assessment-too
l-to-help-judges-decide-which-defendants-to-detain-prior-to-trial/ [https://perma.cc/9Q9W-
MMCW].
64 LJAF, RESULTS FROM THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
– COURT IN KENTUCKY 4 (July 2014) (emphasis omitted), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org
/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/PSA-Court-Kentucky-6-Month-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YB7Y-6RWK].
65 More than 20 Cities and States Adopt Risk Assessment Tool to Help Judges Decide 
Which Defendants to Detain Prior to Trial, supra note 63. 
66 Caroline Preston, A Thirtysomething Billionaire Couple Take on Tough Issues via 
Giving, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 16, 2011), https://philanthropy.com/article/A-
Thirtysomething-Billionaire/157613 [https://perma.cc/LKB7-GGKS].
67 NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS 7 (Aug. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N2FL-43UR].
68 Id.
362 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:2
cases are heard by federal courts of appeals each year.69 Yet, as King,
Cheesman, and Ostrom note, there was little empirical information about these 
cases prior to their resource-intensive study, including information about the 
delays between a state court’s habeas denial and a federal habeas petition; the 
types of habeas challenges raised, such as actual innocence, and whether 
prisoners tend to challenge their sentences, convictions, or both; the 
percentages of habeas cases that fail due to procedural problems such as a 
failure to exhaust claims in state court; the time that it takes for courts to 
process habeas cases; and case outcomes.70 King, Cheesman, and Ostrom 
observe that datasets “maintained by the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts” contain individual case statistics on “filing and termination 
dates, disposition information, whether the petitioner had counsel, and if the 
petitioner received in forma pauperis status,” but “information about which 
party prevailed is missing for most habeas cases.”71
To obtain more thorough data, the researchers used the federal PACER72
database of case information, and because PACER information for cases from 
2002 and earlier was inadequate, they limited their sample to cases filed in 
2003 and 2004 for noncapital cases, selecting a random set of 7.5% of the 
cases to study.73 After removing mislabeled and duplicate cases from the set, 
they studied a total of 2,384 noncapital cases from a diverse geographic area.74
The researchers needed pre-2002 data for capital cases because these cases 
travel through the courts for so many years, and for these samples they 
obtained hard copy data, collecting “original case documents at courthouses 
and federal archives”; they also used some online research for the capital 
dataset.75 To pay for the use of PACER and the many researchers who helped 
gather and analyze the information, King and the other researchers obtained a 
National Institute of Justice grant.76
Perhaps most telling is Professor Brandon Garrett’s experience 
researching the recent, national decline in death sentences for a forthcoming 
book.77 Despite the enormous attention paid to the death penalty, there was no 
existing dataset containing jurisdiction-specific information on death sentences 
from the last twenty years.78 Assembling the data required him to consult 
                                                                                                                     
69 Id. at 9–10.
70 Id. at 11–12. 
71 Id. at 13. 
72 PACER, supra note 43.
73 KING ET AL., supra note 67, at 15.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 2. 
77 BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW THE DEMISE OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4) (on file with author)
(cited with author’s permission).
78 Id.
2017] CRIMINAL JUSTICE BLACK BOX 363
“prison websites, death penalty appeals, and . . . death penalty lawyers around 
the county.”79
These efforts to identify nationwide criminal justice trends show the 
currently herculean task of collecting the necessary data and how a funding 
source, such as a foundation or government grant, is typically needed to 
complete such a large task. The collection of criminal justice data remains a 
labor-intensive effort, in contrast with other contexts in which large amounts 
of raw data are readily found on the internet.80
B. Data and Local Problems
Bulk data could also be enormously useful in remedying criminal justice 
problems at the local level. Much legal scholarship focuses on persuading 
courts to expand constitutional rights.81 But in many areas of criminal justice, 
there is a widespread belief that existing rights are underenforced.82 The nature 
and extent of these violations are, however, difficult to establish in light of the 
largely (and necessarily, in the absence of more complete data) available 
anecdotal evidence.83 If more comprehensive data were available, it could be 
used to identify likely local targets for reform litigation and legislation.84
Three areas of the criminal justice system where existing anecdotal and 
survey-based data suggest that well-established rights are routinely violated in 
some parts of the country—or where great inequities exist even if not 
amounting to a constitutional violation—include bail,85 counsel for indigent 
                                                                                                                     
79 Id.
80 See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
81 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST.
L.J. 723, 768–76 (2011) (arguing for more extensive pretrial justice rights); Justin F. 
Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in § 2254 Habeas Corpus 
Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 46–47 (2010) (arguing that due process entitles 
criminal defendants to de novo review in federal court when they lacked a full and fair 
adjudication of their federal constitutional claims in state court).
82 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 21, at 1351–63 (exploring the problem of money 
bail and, although documenting potential constitutional arguments against its use, also 
focusing on the policy reasons for changing existing practices). 
83 See, e.g., supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text; infra notes 222–24 and 
accompanying text.
84 The lack of information on the workings of state criminal justice systems and the 
need to uncover persistent problems has caused some scholars to suggest creative 
workarounds. Eve Brensike Primus, for example, has suggested that habeas cases should 
be limited to “structural reform litigation” to address widespread, systemic abuses of 
constitutional rights during criminal convictions. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision 
of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 44 (2010); see also Esty, supra note 8, at 137 
(noting the value of improved information collection, analysis, and dissemination to 
informing policy debates in the environmental context). 
85 See infra Part II.B.1.
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defendants,86 and imprisonment for inability to pay a court-ordered fine or fee, 
commonly referred to as debtors’ prison.87
1. Bail and Pretrial Detention
In the bail context, many judges routinely set bail based on schedules with 
monetary amounts that reflect the type of charge, not the defendant’s ability to 
pay.88 This manner of setting bail—which is used to ensure defendants’
presence at trial and good behavior pending trial—allows wealthy defendants, 
even those charged with relatively high-level crimes and who are potentially 
incentivized to flee, to pay their way out of jail while awaiting trial, and it 
causes large percentages of low-risk, nondangerous, indigent defendants to be 
detained before trial.89
Numerous scholarly articles, publications, and studies by nonprofit groups, 
and a small but growing number of class action cases, have begun to document 
the apparently widespread problems in this area.90 The American Bar 
Association estimates that “[t]wo thirds of the 500,000 individuals 
incarcerated in jail and awaiting trial are low bail risk, . . . pos[ing] no 
significant risk to themselves or the community, as well as representing a low 
risk of flight.”91 The Justice Policy Institute observes that “[m]oney 
determines pretrial release for 7 out of 10 people accused of felonies” and that 
“25 percent more people could be safely released from U.S. jails while 
awaiting trial if the proper procedures are put in place.”92 And a small 
scholarly literature provides examples from several jurisdictions of the 
hardships pretrial detention imposes on defendants and their families, such as 
the loss of jobs and housing.93
                                                                                                                     
86 See infra Part II.B.2.
87 See infra Part II.B.3.
88 PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF COUNTY 
PRETRIAL RELEASE POLICIES, PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES 7 (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.pretrial.org/wpfb-file/pji-pretrial-justice-in-america-a-survey-of-county-pretrial
-release-policies-practices-and-outcomes-2010-pdf [https://perma.cc/C6VT-6D5R]
(showing one survey that indicates 64% of counties use bail schedules). 
89 See Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the National Symposium on Pretrial 
Justice, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
general-eric-holder-speaks-national-symposium-pretrial-justice [https://perma.cc/WBN7-
DX5D] (noting that many defendants jailed pretrial are “nonviolent, non-felony offenders, 
charged with crimes ranging from petty theft to public drug use”).
90 See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
91 CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 27, at 2.
92 JUSTICE POLICY INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF 
USING MONEY FOR BAIL 2, 4 (Sept. 2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepoli
cy/documents/bailfail.pdf [https://perma.cc/33YL-9ZYC].
93 See, e.g., Appleman, supra note 38, at 1319–21; Baradaran, supra note 38, at 334; 
Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 334 
(2011); Wiseman, supra note 21, at 1353–54.
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To address some of these problems, Equal Justice Under Law (EJUL), a 
nonprofit group engaged in criminal justice reform litigation and advocacy,94
has begun to identify some of the problematic jurisdictions. It has filed several 
lawsuits in U.S. district courts arguing that jailing indigent defendants solely 
on the basis of their inability to pay a small monetary fine—in this case a fine 
set by a fixed bail schedule—violates equal protection and due process.95
Notably, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) submitted a “Statement of 
Interest” in one of these cases, arguing that setting bail without any 
consideration of a defendant’s ability to pay is unconstitutional.96 EJUL has 
achieved remarkable results, securing numerous rulings against the use of 
money bail without an inquiry into ability to pay.97
This type of litigation will always require on the ground investigation into 
local practices, but analysis of bulk data could help identify the jurisdictions 
likely engaging in unconstitutional practices. Indeed, the limited data available 
shows that release rates vary widely among jurisdictions (as well as 
demographic classes),98 and it is currently difficult, if not impossible, to know 
which county, state, or federal jails tend to most frequently host defendants 
who are detained simply because they could not pay; which judges in which 
                                                                                                                     
94 About Us, EQUAL JUST. UNDER L., http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/about-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/BBT6-GDQT].
95 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 11, Snow v. Lambert, No.15-cv-00567 (M.D. 
La. Aug. 25, 2015) (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection 
clauses have long prohibited keeping a person in jail because of the person’s inability to 
make a monetary payment. Defendants violate Plaintiff’s rights by placing and keeping her 
in jail when she cannot afford to pay the amount of money set by the generic secured bail 
‘schedule’ used by Defendants.”).
96 Statement of Interest of the United States, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv-
00034-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2015).
97 Ending the American Money Bail System, supra note 36.
98 See, e.g., THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239243, PRETRIAL 
RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 2008–2010, at 3 (Nov. 2012),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prmfdc0810.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X4D-85DA]
(noting an overall 36% pretrial release rate in federal district courts but not identifying
different release rates for different courts); id. at 10 (noting large differences in pretrial 
release rates “between black and white defendants,” particularly for drug offenses, with 
60% of white defendants released and 36% of black defendants released on average across 
the federal district courts); Frequently Asked Questions About Pretrial Release Decision 
Making, AM. BAR ASS’N., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/crimi
naljustice/FAQ_Pretrial_Justice.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ULM-Q7VB]
(describing successful pretrial release programs, and noting 80% release rates in the 
District of Columbia and 74% release rates in Kentucky before Kentucky began using the 
Laura and John Arnold Foundation risk assessment, which further increased release); cf.
OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, No. 08-75, PRETRIAL 
RELEASE PROGRAMS VARY ACROSS THE STATE; NEW REPORTING REQUIREMENTS POSE 
CHALLENGES 9 (Dec. 2008), http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0875rpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2668-J7UZ] (showing the number of participants in pretrial release 
programs in Florida counties as ranging from 113 in Citrus County to 11,101 in Dade 
County).
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jurisdictions tend to rely most heavily on bail schedules rather than on 
defendants’ ability to pay; how often and in what manner released defendants 
violate the terms of their release; and how long each defendant is detained 
while awaiting trial. With more data available (and analyzed), reform groups 
and government agencies working in this area would be better able to identify 
likely targets for reform litigation.99 In litigation and in legislatures, data on 
bail amounts, the types of charges lodged against defendants, defendants’
income, bail amounts set, and length of pretrial detention would help to 
demonstrate the inequality and inefficacy of the current system.
Another inadequately documented problem in the bail context is the 
expansion of conditions attached to pretrial release—including the electronic 
monitoring of numerous defendants who are not particularly dangerous or 
likely to flee.100 It is generally understood that the use of pretrial monitoring is 
expanding, in part due to decreasing costs of equipment like ankle monitors.101
                                                                                                                     
99 See Ending the American Money Bail System, supra note 36.
100 See, e.g., Robert S. Gable, Left to Their Own Devices: Should Manufacturers of 
Offender Monitoring Equipment Be Liable for Design Defect?, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 333, 338–39 (discussing states that require electronic monitoring in certain contexts 
and generally stating that electronic surveillance is “increasingly popular,” but not 
providing specific usage numbers); Annesley K. Schmidt, Electronic Monitoring: What 
Does the Literature Tell Us?, FED. PROB., Dec. 1998, at 10, 11 (observing that “[i]t is not 
known how many offenders are being monitored on a particular date, from a 1-day count, 
or over some time period such as a year,” and describing the incomplete studies that relied 
on surveys to attempt to ascertain the numbers); see also Molly Carney, Note, Correction 
Through Omniscience: Electronic Monitoring and the Escalation of Crime Control, 40 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 279, 287–89 (2012) (providing examples of pilot programs and 
describing the increased use of monitoring but not locating or identifying statistics on the 
exact amount of monitoring in the pretrial or other contexts). Some data is, however, 
available for limited jurisdictions. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
OFFENDER SUPERVISION WITH ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY 16–17 (2d ed. 2006), 
http://www.appa-net.org/eweb/docs/APPA/pubs/OSET_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NXS2-
VGF5] (describing annual surveys by the Journal of Offender Monitoring that use
manufacturer’s reports on the number of units manufactured and deployed to “estimate”
the number of offenders, not pretrial detainees, that are released and electronically 
supervised, and noting projections that a total of 200,000 GPS and radio frequency units 
would be in use in 2009); THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF 
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 25 (Mar. 2009), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2009/0
3/02/pspp_1in31_report_final_web_32609.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2M3-Q85W] (noting 
that electronic monitoring has become more common but only providing examples of 
programs that increasingly use it rather than describing numbers of offenders monitored);
see also Cynthia Dizikes & Todd Lighty, Electronic Monitoring Spikes in Cook County,
CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-electronic-monitoring-
met-20150222-story.html [https://perma.cc/S83S-Q2S4] (“Judges last year ordered 14,717 
men and women awaiting trial onto electronic home monitoring as a condition of their 
release from custody, compared with 8,657 in 2013, according to figures provided by the 
sheriff’s office.”).
101 See Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1367–68 (2008) 
(“[T]he economics of technological control enable the regulation of greater numbers of 
persons under less stringent conditions for a longer period of time and to a greater degree 
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But empirical support to document the scope of this “net widening” problem 
or the jurisdictions with the largest monitoring expansions remains elusive.102
2. Counsel for Indigent Defendants
In the indigent defense context, where there is a long-recognized 
constitutional right to counsel,103 bulk data could be used to identify the 
jurisdictions that routinely deny counsel, or provide counsel too late, to the 
largest percentage of indigent defendants. This would allow the targeted use of 
nonprofit funds in areas where the most improvement is needed, and it could 
potentially shame policymakers in these areas into providing additional 
funding for indigent defense despite the general unpopularity of this funding 
priority. But the existing data is, for the most part, too generalized to be useful 
for this purpose. Based on a 2007 survey of 1,046 public defender offices, 950 
of which provided at least partial responses,104 we know total expenditures on 
public defense by these agencies and offices that coordinate appointed 
counsel.105 We also know the types of cases that tend to dominate county 
public defenders’ caseloads, among other data.106 Another BJS survey-based 
report describes the number of states that use public defense agencies as 
opposed to court-appointed counsel,107 the attrition rate for public defender 
programs,108 the percentage of programs that exceeded maximum 
recommended annual caseloads for attorneys,109 caseload increases between 
1999 to 2007,110 and other data. And the underlying survey data used by the 
BJS in these studies would point to the specific states where attorneys 
                                                                                                                     
than an equivalent physical intrusion.”); Wiseman, supra note 21, at 1372–73 (noting cost 
savings realized when counties, states, and certain federal districts increased release and 
monitoring and reduced pretrial detention). But see Eric Maes & Benjamin Mine, Some 
Reflections on the Possible Introduction of Electronic Monitoring as an Alternative to Pre-
Trial Detention in Belgium, 52 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 144, 150–57 (2013) (arguing that 
electronic monitoring is costly and poses numerous privacy concerns).
102 Cf. Wiseman, supra note 21, at 1368–70 (describing the limited studies on pretrial 
electronic monitoring and its effectiveness). 
103 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary system 
of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”).
104 DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 231175,
COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 14 (Sept. 2010), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FET-QP2P].
105 Id. at 3.
106 Id. at 9.
107 LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228229, 
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007, at 1 (Sept. 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/p
ub/pdf/spdp07.pdf [https://perma.cc/84W3-2JXK].
108 Id. at 18.
109 Id. at 12.
110 Id. at 18.
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exceeded recommended caseloads and other state-specific data.111 Further, 
there is abundant, generalized data on the underfunding of counsel for indigent 
defendants,112 the lack of adequate investigative support for these counsel,113
and other systemic challenges. But there appears to be no available data that 
shows which county, state, or federal courts—or even which jurisdictions—
deny counsel to the highest percentage of indigent defendants or most 
routinely provide counsel at too late a stage. Even where information on the 
appointment of counsel or lack of appointment is included within court 
dockets or summaries, it is often difficult to tell why counsel was not 
appointed, such as whether an indigency hearing was not held, the defendant 
waived the right to counsel, or the defendant was determined to have adequate 
funds.
The groups that have succeeded in showing routine denials of counsel in 
certain jurisdictions, such as within the Williamson County and Gillespie 
County, Texas courthouses, have had to physically send their attorneys to 
courts to monitor court proceedings.114 This type of effort may still be 
necessary, but if the types of data described were readily available, its analysis 
would direct and support policy reforms and litigation.
3. Debtors’ Prisons
There is a clear federal115 and state constitutional right116 against the 
jailing of defendants who cannot afford to pay fees related to criminal matters 
on the basis of failure to pay alone. Yet anecdotal evidence and some limited 
statistical analyses show that imprisoning defendants who fail to pay probation 
fees and fines (often levied by private probation agencies), child support, and 
similar debts is an increasingly common practice.117 Several organizations 
have begun conducting broad analyses of the jurisdictions that appear to most 
commonly jail defendants for a failure to pay, with the American Civil 
                                                                                                                     
111 Id. at 12. 
112 See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 
9–10 (Dec. 2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_i
ndigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authchec
kdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9J5-VMWJ]; see also NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM.,
supra note 21, at 99–100. 
113 LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 107, at 1. 
114 See supra notes 25, 37 and accompanying text. The Texas Fair Defense Project, 
which filed the cases exposing these access to counsel problems, was able to identify the 
lack of appointment of counsel, but could not ascertain the reasons for the failure to 
appoint counsel, whether it was because a defendant waived counsel or hired private 
counsel. E-mail from Harry Williams, to author (Feb. 19, 2016) (on file with author).
115 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983). 
116 See Wagner, supra note 21, at 383 (“Today most state constitutions explicitly 
forbid imprisonment for civil debts.”). 
117 See infra notes 118–23 and accompanying text. 
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Liberties Union (ACLU) investigating Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, 
and Washington State.118 The organization collected its data based on a survey 
of “state ACLU affiliates asking them to provide any information they had on 
debtors’ prisons in their state,” and it posted a similar survey on a National 
Legal Aid and Defender Association listserv.119 The ACLU selected these 
states based on the survey responses it received and then, from December 
2009 through July 2010, relied upon “ACLU affiliate staff, law students, 
volunteer attorneys, and law professors” to investigate practices in the 
identified states through review of local and state case dockets and pleadings,
and interviews of individuals involved in these states’ criminal justice 
systems.120 Thus, approximately a year and a half of heavy legwork resulted in 
case studies and descriptions of certain debtors’ prison problems in five states.
The ACLU subsequently filed lawsuits challenging debtors’ prison in several 
jurisdictions, such as Biloxi, Mississippi;121 and Benton County, 
Washington.122
The Southern Center for Human Rights has similarly sued private 
probation companies, diversion centers, and cities in an effort to stop the 
practice of imprisoning defendants for a failure to pay criminal fees and 
fines.123 Although on the ground investigation will always be necessary, bulk 
data would make the jurisdictions with the most problematic practices easier to 
identify and would allow scarce resources to be put to the best use. Electronic 
information on the amount of probation fine or fee, child support, or other debt 
owed; the result (imprisonment or otherwise); the length of the sentence; and 
other data could provide a more accurate, detailed, and comprehensive picture 
of the problem with much less effort.
Analysis of better data could also help identify new, localized problems in 
the criminal justice area that are as-yet unnoticed or underexplored. For 
example, although the DOJ often researches and suggests widespread, national 
reforms, it also targets certain jurisdictions for specific reforms. The DOJ 
began its investigation of Ferguson, Missouri’s juvenile justice system only 
after the highly publicized shooting of Michael Brown by a police officer.124
                                                                                                                     
118 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 36, at 5.
119 Id. at 13.
120 Id.
121 See generally Class Action Complaint, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-cv-348-
HSO-JCG (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2015). 
122 See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Fuentes v. Benton 
County, No. 15-2-02976-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2015).
123 Complaint at 2, Edwards v. Red Hills Cmty. Prob., LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00067-LJA 
(M.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2015); Amended Complaint at 2, Thomas v. City of Gulfport, No. 1:05-
CV-349-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Aug. 9, 2005); Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3, 
Hurley v. Hinton, No. HC00532 (Ga. Super. Ct. Sept. 2006), https://www.schr.org/files/hur
ley_habeas.pdf [https://perma.cc/27BR-EXPW].
124 See Matt Apuzzo, Department of Justice Sues Ferguson, Which Reversed Course 
on Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politi
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The DOJ reviewed 32,169 cases (and more than 14,000 pages of 
documents),125 interviewed court personnel, attended a juvenile detention 
hearing, read transcripts of seventy proceedings, met with state and local 
public defender staff, spoke with representatives of juvenile law clinics, 
interviewed parents of several youth who had gone through the family court 
system, and reviewed existing Missouri-specific reports to identify a variety of 
problems.126 These include, for example, disproportionate representation of 
African American juvenile defendants in pretrial detention and several other 
“major decision points” in juvenile justice, such as post-adjudication 
placement of defendants in youth services custody.127 The DOJ also observed
that indigent youth in Missouri routinely lack access to counsel at critical 
stages of their cases, noting that “[a]pproximately 60% of lawyers who 
represent detained youth in Family Court enter the case at least seven days –
and as many as 232 days – after the child’s detention hearing is held.”128
Many jurisdictions that have not received attention focused on Ferguson likely 
suffer from similar problems—problems that could be at least partially 
revealed by readily available bulk criminal justice data—that remain 
undetected. 
C. Bulk Data and Reform 
If docket-level data on criminal justice cases were collected in a uniform 
manner by even just a few states and large county courts and made 
electronically available, this would provide scholars, policymakers, and reform 
groups with a clearer picture of the criminal justice system without requiring 
time-intensive surveys, visits to courtrooms, interviews, and the other methods 
commonly relied on now. For local reform, on the ground investigation would 
likely remain essential, but bulk data analysis could provide the initial picture 
needed to point investigations toward the most problematic areas. Further, 
where investigative and anecdotal data already exists, as it does for bail, 
indigent counsel, and debtors’ prisons, empirical data would provide important 
support for reform arguments and legal complaints that currently must rely 
primarily on the anecdotal data. 
Outside the litigation context, extensive criminal justice data could also 
trigger legislators to introduce reform legislation and provide needed evidence 
for legislative reforms. Reform advocates currently have to rely on summary 
statistics to support their arguments, such as the often-cited statistic that two-
                                                                                                                     
cs/justice-department-sues-ferguson-over-police-deal.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/D7MH-
V2H7] (“The shooting was deemed justified, but it . . . brought the attention of the 
Department of Justice to the city’s police practices.”); see also CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra 
note 28, at 5 n.6.
125 CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 28, at 12, 34.
126 Id. at 12–13.
127 Id. at 35.
128 Id. at 15.
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thirds of the individuals in jail at any given time are individuals who are 
awaiting trial but are low-risk defendants.129 More specific data—particularly 
data highlighting high pretrial detention rates in certain jurisdictions despite 
defendants in that jurisdiction not being more likely to flee or be violent—
could help to support state and county legislative reforms.
Finally, the data could directly change the behavior of police, hearing 
officers, attorneys, and judges, particularly the many judges at the state and 
county level that are elected. With knowledge that statistics will be 
systematically collected, disclosed, and analyzed, officials in the criminal 
justice system might have a greater incentive to avoid constitutional 
violations.130 Further, individuals within the criminal justice system who want 
to produce better results but are underresourced and overburdened could use 
big data to identify targeted improvements. As Pamela Metzger and Andrew 
Ferguson note, public defenders could benefit from systemically collected data 
that might show the areas in which avoidable errors tend to occur most 
frequently,131 and the types of case strategies—such as spending time 
interviewing witnesses versus filing more motions that are more likely to lead 
to positive outcomes—and thus should potentially be the focus of attorneys’
limited resources.132 Professor Ferguson similarly believes that the use of big 
data could improve jury selection, making juries more representative of the 
community, among other improvements.133 The influence of statistics on 
police, attorneys, juries, judges, and other individuals within the criminal 
justice system will likely not be as powerful as more direct signals, such as 
body cameras on police134 or the docking of pay for attorneys who make 
repeated errors, but it should have some deterrent power.
In order to capture these benefits, however, there must be significant 
changes in how criminal justice data is collected, stored, and made public 
because the available data does not allow for the type of analysis that would 
guide reform priorities and further inform litigation and policy-based efforts.
                                                                                                                     
129 CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 27, at 2.
130 Some believe that excluding evidence collected in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment has only mild effects on police behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 918 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976); William C. 
Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: 
The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311, 358–59
(1991). But more direct data pointing to constitutional violations committed by specific 
officers, and widely publicized data, might have a slightly greater deterrent effect. 
131 Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 42, at 1099–100.
132 Id. at 1097–118.
133 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Big Data Jury, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 935, 935–
36 (2016).
134 See, e.g, PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 32, at
31–32 (noting that a “randomized control trial” “found that the officers wearing the 
cameras had 87.5 percent fewer incidents of use of force and 59 percent fewer complaints 
than the officers not wearing the cameras”).
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The following Part describes the limited data that is currently collected in the 
criminal justice areas in which it could offer the most value.
III. EXISTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA SOURCES
As described in the preceding Part, there are significant potential benefits 
to collecting and disseminating basic, uniform information data from the local, 
state, and federal levels.135 Based on the most pressing issues addressed above, 
some of the most valuable data would include defendant demographics such as 
age, race, income level, family ties, and job; type and date of charges; date of 
appointment of counsel, if counsel was appointed, and reasons for a failure to 
appoint counsel; date of the bail hearing; conditions of pretrial release and the 
amount of bail set or pretrial detention and length of detention; whether or not 
the defendant appeared for trial or committed pretrial crimes; plea bargain or 
conviction date; sentence and length of sentence; date of release or release on 
parole; and parole conditions and outcomes.136 As discussed in this Part, many 
courts collect some of this data within dockets, and jails and prisons retain 
certain statistics about the defendants within their systems, but they do not 
routinely collect all of this data or record it in the same way. In part due to the 
lack of uniform data collection, and in part due to the failure of those who 
collect this data to make it electronically available, the existing data is 
difficult, if not impossible, to systematically acquire or analyze.
A. Data Sources
Several groups already report or collect and synthesize criminal justice 
data, but not in consistent ways, and often without making it available 
electronically. State and local courts and court administrators already produce 
some of the data most important for the criminal justice reform efforts 
identified in Part I. With some modification, including more uniformity with 
respect to what is reported and, critically, in the manner of disseminating it, 
this information could be quite valuable to criminal justice study and reform.
Although commercial entities already collect and compile massive databases 
of criminal justice information, they tend to be too expensive for bulk 
searches, and to focus only on information needed for background checks, 
such as convictions.
1. State and Local Governments
Data collection and distribution policies vary substantially across state and 
local governments. In general, the institutions that routinely interact with 
criminal defendants already collect and record some or all of the necessary 
                                                                                                                     
135 See supra Part II.
136 Id.
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information. In addition to collecting data, courts at all levels have historically 
provided public access to records.137 This is due in part to Supreme Court 
doctrine, which provides a “right to inspect and copy public records and 
documents, including judicial records and documents,” while allowing each 
court to deny access where court files might be used for “improper 
purposes.”138 Courts have allowed public access for reasons of tradition, 
public trust, and integrity, among others.139 But many courts, police 
departments, jails, and prisons collect only a portion of the data necessary to 
provide a relatively comprehensive picture of problems in the criminal justice 
system.140 Moreover, the data is collected and reported in nonuniform ways, 
making large-scale analysis more difficult. And even if the records exist, 
access is often a problem. Some local and state courts provide no online 
records;141 others collect limited information about defendants and their cases 
but provide only limited electronic access for a fee and prevent or limit bulk 
access142 in order to avoid commercial misuse of defendants’ private 
information.143 But the barriers are much higher than they need to be, 
                                                                                                                     
137 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1145 (2002).
138 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978) (footnote omitted).
For a thorough examination of public access to court records and limitations on this access 
as a result of Supreme Court doctrine and the common law, see Solove, supra note 137, at 
1154–60.
139 See MD. COURTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS 6,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/access/finalreport3-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJ76-PWLP]. 
140 See infra notes 147–48.
141 See, e.g., Privacy/Public Access to Court Records, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.,
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-Fairness/Privacy-Public-Access-to-Court-Record
s/State-Links.aspx?cat=Public%20Access%20Web%20Sites#New%20Hampshire [https://
perma.cc/4SAN-U4GQ] (concluding that Maine, New Hampshire, and North Carolina 
have “no online court records”). 
142 See, e.g., ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. pt. I, ch. 6, § 1-605(D) (2010), 
http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/admcode/pdfcurrentcode/1-605_New_Dec_09.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/Y65G-3D2L] (requiring a “dissemination agreement” for requests for bulk data 
between the requestor and the bulk data custodian, as well as a “subscription service”); 
CAL. R. CT. 2.503(f)–(g) (“The court may only grant electronic access to an electronic 
record . . . on a case-by-case basis. . . . The court may provide bulk distribution of only its 
electronic records of a calendar, register of actions, and index.”); N.H. CT. R. GUIDELINES 
FOR PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, http://www.courts.state.nh.us/rules/misc/misc-
8.htm [https://perma.cc/DKM5-54SQ] (“Access to large numbers of records at any one
time shall not be permitted.”).
143 See, e.g., MD. COURTS, supra note 139, at 1 (“These technological advances have 
led to increased concerns about, among other things, protection of privacy, protection 
against risk of harm, and the consequences of sale by businesses of information from court 
records.”); SEARCH, THE NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD 
INFORMATION 46 (2005) [hereinafter SEARCH], http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCS
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particularly in light of the fact that private information could simply be 
omitted from the data prior to electronic posting.
The records most likely to contain the information needed for big data 
analysis in the criminal justice system are case summaries and dockets.144
Many contain information such as the charge and degree of felony charged; 
and the statute under which the defendant was charged; case dispositions and 
pleas; the maximum prison sentence and length of confinement; years of 
probation; penalties and conditions imposed such as community service and 
drug treatment and randomized testing; subsequent events such as violation of 
probation.145 Court summaries from county and state courts also sometimes 
include the date on which a surety bond was posted, if any; dates of request for 
counsel for an indigent defendant; dates of filing of plea forms; and dates on 
which the judgment and sentence were issued and commitment occurred, 
among other data.146 These records do not, however, consistently147 include 
important data that show when and if counsel was appointed for indigent 
defendants, the amount of the bond set by the judge (if bond was set),148 and 
                                                                                                                     
CJRI.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUJ6-PVP6] (“In attempting to balance the competing interests 
posed by new technologies, privacy interests, and historical principles of openness, the 
courts have grappled with several questions.”). 
144 SEARCH, supra note 143, at 45 (“[T]he primary source of criminal history 
information for commercial vendors is the court system.”).
145 See, e.g., Case Summary: Case No. 89-CF-009822-A, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY 
CTS. REC. SEARCH, http://pubrec10.hillsclerk.com/Unsecured/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=40
52837 [https://perma.cc/3NR2-8NYD] (showing court appointed counsel, sentence, and 
case disposition); see also infra notes 147–48.
146 See, e.g., Case Summary: Case No. 88-CF-004404-A, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY 
CTS. REC. SEARCH, http://pubrec10.hillsclerk.com/Unsecured/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=78
48687 [https://perma.cc/PA58-GM77].
147 Some, however, do include this data. See, e.g., Case Details – Summary: Case # 
2016NY040846, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcrim_attorn
ey/Detail?which=case&docketNumber=JvwWNX464YN2B8Fd/2okRQ==&countyId=ftU
CLXxA/VgUxT4CDSVwBw==&docketId=RGepsZhfKEAkPaKV8x_PLUS_DRA==&do
cketDseq=o6PDyKIx4BvSfbvyCgDnHw==&defendantName=Johnson,+Joseph+E&court
=New+York+Criminal+Court&courtType=L&recordType=C&recordNum=4YsLz49JROP
ZoddX8PjTVw== [https://perma.cc/YCM5-E62F] (showing the type of attorney appointed, 
such as “Legal Aid,” although not showing the date on which the attorney was assigned to 
the defendant’s case). 
148 But see, e.g., Charleston County Circuit Court Case Details Public Index: Case 
Number 2016A1010200127, CHARLESTON COUNTY CLERK CT., http://jcmsweb.charlestonc
ounty.org/publicindex/ (click “Accept,” then enter case number 2016A1010200127) 
[https://perma.cc/5XXQ-YJ3N] (providing data on bond type and amount); Docket No. 
D03D-CR16-0154213-S, ST. CONN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.jud2.ct.gov/crdockets/Dock
etNoEntry.aspx?source=Pend (enter docket number D03D-CR16-0154213-S to search)
[https://perma.cc/SJ2Z-CXXE] (providing individual pretrial case data that indicates 
defendant’s birth year, arrest date, bond amount and type, charges and statute under which 
the defendant was charged, and the class and type of the charge, e.g., misdemeanor,
although the information must be located using a docket number or defendant’s name and 
is only provided on a case-by-case basis).
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information necessary for identifying problems in the system such as pretrial 
detention and unaffordable bail amounts for low-income defendants. 
As introduced above, beyond differences in information collection, much 
of the case summary and docket data available from states and local 
governments is not easily accessible online.149 When county and state 
databases with criminal case information do exist, they typically require 
individuals searching for a case summary to input the name of the defendant or 
the case number.150 Access to the full database, which could be downloaded 
                                                                                                                     
149 See, e.g., supra note 141 and accompanying text.
150 See, e.g., Appellate Courts: General Docket, ST. MISS. JUDICIARY,
http://courts.ms.gov/appellate_courts/generaldocket.html [https://perma.cc/9UGB-EWN7]
(requiring case year and sequence number, party name, or attorney name for a search); 
Case Lookup, N.M. CTS., https://caselookup.nmcourts.gov/caselookup/app
[https://perma.cc/7FZY-MBJ8] (providing only “criminal Domestic Violence and DWI 
historic convictions from September 1, 1991 onwards” and later for municipal courts, and 
requiring a search by name or case number); Case Search, CLERK SUPERIOR ST. &
MAGISTRATE CTS. COUNTY GWINNETT, http://www.gwinnettcourts.com/casesearch/ 
[https://perma.cc/9GMC-MZGC] (allowing individual searches by case number, party 
name, attorney, judge, or scheduled events); Case Search, MICH. CTS.,
http://courts.mi.gov/opinions_orders/case_search/pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/UD
T5-2N87] (requiring a search by docket number or party name); Case Search,
MYCASE.IN.GOV, https://mycase.in.gov/Search.aspx?ID=100 [https://perma.cc/R7RD-
DF72] (providing access to certain Indiana courts but requiring an individual case number, 
a party, or attorney name for a search); Circuit Courts of Illinois, JUDICI,
https://www.judici.com/courts/illinois_courts.jsp [https://perma.cc/Y7KM-733U] (last 
modified Apr. 17, 2017) (providing limited free data for approximately eighty Illinois 
circuit courts but requiring payment for “multi-court/multi-case results”); CourtConnect,
ARK. JUDICIARY, https://courts.arkansas.gov/administration/acap/courtconnect [https://per
ma.cc/5XFR-LLDN] (providing full information from some county courts and partial 
information from others, but requiring a search by case name or number); Court Case
Search, WELCOME TO CHANDLER, http://www.chandleraz.gov/cjis/courtcasesearch/ 
[https://perma.cc/VZU6-42VF] (requiring searches by case number or defendant name for 
cases in Chandler, Arizona); Criminal Case Summary, SUPERIOR CT. CAL.,
http://www.lacourt.org/criminalcasesummary/ui/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/RB2P-C4RT]
(requiring the case number); Criminal Cases: PROMIS/Gavel Public Access: Search Menu,
N.J. CTS. PUB. ACCESS, https://mccs.njcourts.gov/webe4/ExternalPGPA/ [https://perma.cc/
F9QD-4A7J] (providing access only to criminal cases for defendants indicted and 
convicted or sentenced in New Jersey Superior Court, and requiring a search by name, 
indictment/accusation number, or court disposition report (CDR) number); Criminal/Motor
Vehicle Case Look-Up, ST. CONN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.jud.ct.gov/crim.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Q9VJ-89QK] (requiring search by defendant or docket number for 
convictions and pending cases); Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository, supra note 46
(providing case information for all Idaho courts with the exception of Twin Falls and Ada 
County, searchable individually by name or case number, and maintaining confidentiality 
by omitting “the first six characters of social security numbers, street addresses, telephone 
numbers, [and] any personal identification numbers,” such as “motor vehicle operator’s
license numbers”); Iowa Courts Online Search, IOWA CTS., https://www.iowacourts.state.ia
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and searched for all cases, typically requires permission of the court 
administrator.151 Many state and local courts also charge a fee for access to 
individual criminal case summaries.152
                                                                                                                     
.us/ESAWebApp/TrialSimpFrame [https://perma.cc/B976-2BPS] (providing case 
information for all Iowa courts but requiring search by name, case ID, or citation number); 
Maryland Judiciary Case Search Criteria, MD. JUDICIARY, http://casesearch.courts.state.m
d.us/casesearch/inquirySearch.jis [https://perma.cc/VW7R-YGFV] (requiring entry of a 
party name or case number in order to search circuit or district court records); Minnesota 
Trial Court Public Access (MPA) Remote View, MINN. JUD. BRANCH,
http://pa.courts.state.mn.us/Search.aspx?ID=100 [https://perma.cc/J5Y3-P67H] (requiring 
case number, defendant name, citation number, or attorney name for a search); Online 
Court Records Search, CIVITEKFLORIDA.COM, https://www.civitekflorida.com/ocrs/county/
index.xhtml [https://perma.cc/M9RJ-ZJEL] (providing online court data for courts in 
approximately thirty-two Florida counties); Online Court Records Search,
FRANKLINCLERK.COM, https://www.civitekflorida.com/ocrs/app/search.xhtml [https://perm
a.cc/TP7N-MYDL] (requiring search by the defendant’s first and last name or the case 
sequence number for cases in Franklin County, Florida); ON DEMAND CT. RECS.,
http://www1.odcr.com/ [https://perma.cc/45H8-NMGP] (requiring party name, case 
number, or date for searches of court records for cases in Oklahoma); Public Access to 
Court Information, ARIZ. JUD. BRANCH, https://apps.supremecourt.az.gov/publicaccess/%2
8X%281%29S%28xo13i1m03tcgts55sx32hci3%29%29/caselookup.aspx [https://perma.cc/
9VMK-ZVAG] (offering access to court records from all but twelve county and state 
courts in Arizona but requiring searches by name or case number); Public Case 
Information, SUPREME JUD. CT. & APPEALS CT. MASS., http://www.ma-
appellatecourts.org/index.php [https://perma.cc/ZM7U-536R] (requiring a search by 
involved party or docket number); Public View Docket, ST. MONT. OFF. CLERK SUP. CT.,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/activecase.jsp [https://perma.cc/M4VD-AJ84]
(requiring case number, party name, or attorney name); Search Cases, ST. LA.,
http://www.la4th.org/SearchCases.aspx [https://perma.cc/N42W-U7DW] (requiring a 
search by district or appellate court case number or attorney bar roll number); Smart 
Search, R.I. JUDICIARY PUB. PORTAL, https://publicportal.courts.ri.gov/PublicPortal/Home/
Dashboard/29 [https://perma.cc/7LQL-BRFW] (requiring search by party name or record 
number); WebCriminal, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://manhattanda.org/case-
information (requiring a case number or defendant name) [https://perma.cc/KKP2-QFQ5].
151 CourtView: Justice Solutions, FAIRFIELD COUNTY CLERK CTS.,
http://courtview.co.fairfield.oh.us/eservices/searc1h.page.3?x=nojSzI8grhRfsG5ne3CyIw 
[https://perma.cc/2YDR-BNB7] (allowing searches by case type); Detailed Case Search,
SECOND JUD. DISTRICT CT. ST. NEV., https://www.washoecourts.com/index.cfm?page=cas
esearch&CaseNum=&CaseCapt=&CaseType=CR [https://perma.cc/DJ66-WDXW]
(allowing a broad case search by “case type,” such as “criminal,” which produces 
numerous cases and associated data); Public Index, CHARLESTON COUNTY,
http://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx [https://perma.cc/DZE4-
YBNA] (allowing searches by date range, which produces numerous criminal dockets);
Your Missouri Courts, MO. CASE.NET, https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/base/welcome.do
[https://perma.cc/VSW2-YAS9] (allowing for a search by filing date, which produces 
numerous cases and data about each case).
152 See, e.g., District Court Records Search, KAN. OFF. JUD. ADMIN.,
https://www.kansas.gov/countyCourts/ [https://perma.cc/U3ZK-UMNM] (“The cost is 
$1.00 per search and $1.00 per case retrieved for view.”); Just One Look, ALACOURT.COM,
https://pa.alacourt.com/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/TLA8-SQ4U] (indicating a cost of 
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Some states require uniform reporting and data collection by all courts 
within the state—a practice that, if followed in all states, would substantially 
improve data availability. For example, through New York State’s Unified 
Court System, “[c]ity, district, county, supreme courts, courts acting as 
appellate courts, and the Court of Appeals have a responsibility to report the 
criminal case outcome to the Unified Court System which maintains a 
repository of court case information.”153 Certain courts “report information 
directly to the state repository,” whereas others send data to the Office of 
Court Administration (OCA); this office then sends the data in electronic form 
to the state repository.154 For each defendant in the system with arrest 
information, the court action closing out that defendant’s case also must be 
included in the system.155 Specific information collected and reported by all 
local and state courts in New York to the repository includes “Defendant 
Pedigree Information,” which consists of “[n]ame and [a]lias(es),” sex, race, 
and “[a]ge or date of birth, if available and verifiable.”156 The information also 
must include “Criminal History Identifiers” including a unique record number 
that the state assigns to each defendant,157 other tracking numbers, and the 
arrest date. The repository contains arrest information such as date and place 
of the crime and “[d]etailed [a]rrest [c]harge information,” as well as 
information about whether the arrestee is a juvenile.158 And finally, the court 
disposition information in the repository includes the name of the court and 
detailed “[a]rrangement or [d]isposition [c]harge information” including the 
title, section, and subsection of the state law under which the defendant was 
charged, the class and category of charge, the degree of the charge, and the
number of counts, among other data points.159
New York’s repository lacks some useful data, such as pretrial release or 
detention information. Nonetheless, as a compilation of uniform records from 
all courts within the state, it is a model for improved information collection 
                                                                                                                     
$9.99 for a name or case number search in Alabama court records); Nebraska Trial Courts 
Online Case Search, NEB. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.nebraska.gov/justicecc/ccname.cgi 
[https://perma.cc/KB4Z-GREE] (providing information on up to thirty cases for a $15 
search fee); OJCIN OnLine, OR. CTS., http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/OnlineServices/OJIN/
pages/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/X6LC-YFWS] (granting access to criminal and civil 
records for a subscription); Public Case Access System, SACRAMENTO SUPERIOR CT.,
https://services.saccourt.ca.gov/PublicCaseAccess/ [https://perma.cc/4VJ5-8QMR] (noting 
public access fees).
153 Division of Criminal Justice Services: Introduction, N.Y. ST.,
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/stdpractices/jud.htm [https://perma.cc/F8F8-H3WD].
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.; see also LEGAL ACTION CTR., YOUR NEW YORK STATE RAP SHEET 11 (2015),
http://lac.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Your_New_York_State_Rap_Sheet_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D7TM-7KS2].
158 Division of Criminal Justice Services: Introduction, supra note 153.
159 Id.
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efforts. The state has important measures in place to ensure that inputs are 
accurate and reported using the same terms (for example, the same 
descriptions of the type of sentence imposed), and is corrected and updated 
when better information about a particular case becomes available.160 To help 
achieve these goals, the state provides basic instructions to the courts and 
police on reporting requirements161 and information about how to make 
corrections.162 The computer system run by the OCA—which collects records 
from certain courts and provides it to the centralized state repository—also 
produces automated warnings when inputs appear to have anomalies, such as 
“conflicting information or unmatched cases.”163 Further, the state directs the 
OCA and the Department of Criminal Justice Services, which maintains the 
statewide repository of criminal justice data, to operate an “ongoing 
reconciliation process” to ensure uniform reporting and that there are not 
discrepancies between the two systems.164
Unfortunately, however, New York’s criminal justice records are not 
readily electronically accessible to researchers and reformers. As is the case in 
other states, bulk searches that would unearth numerous individual criminal 
case summaries are not permitted: the individual defendant’s name must be 
known and entered for each summary to be located.165 While this practice 
helps to protect the privacy of individual defendants, many aspects of the 
repository could be publicly available—with identifying information 
removed—without compromising defendants’ privacy. Similarly, 
Pennsylvania, which also has a unified court information system, permits only 
individual searches of criminal docket sheets by specific case identifying 
information, such as docket number or participant name.166
Some local governments provide similar types of information online,167
although these systems are generally subject to the limitations described 
                                                                                                                     
160 Division of Criminal Justice Services: Judicial Processing – Reporting to UCS and 
DCJS – Monitoring Criminal Cases, N.Y. ST., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/stdpracti
ces/jud2a.htm [https://perma.cc/7BLZ-NEHJ].
161 Division of Criminal Justice Services: Judicial Processing – Criminal Case 
Documentation, N.Y. ST., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/stdpractices/jud1a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2XDD-NE89]; Division of Criminal Justice Services: Judicial Processing 
– Reporting to UCS and DCJS – General Reporting Requirements, N.Y. ST.,
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/stdpractices/jud2c.htm [https://perma.cc/W4AF-
GBUY]; Division of Criminal Justice Services: Judicial Processing – Reporting to UCS 
and DCJS – Reporting the Sentence Imposed, N.Y. ST., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/
stdpractices/jud2g.htm [https://perma.cc/T7PR-NW9F].
162 Division of Criminal Justice Services: Judicial Processing – Reporting to UCS and 
DCJS – Monitoring Criminal Cases, supra note 160.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 WebCriminal, supra note 150.
166 Common Pleas Courts Docket Sheets, UNIFIED JUD. SYS. PA.,
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CP.aspx [https://perma.cc/M5VZ-WYKG].
167 See supra notes 145–52.
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above. Even if bulk data from individual localities could be easily obtained, 
cross-jurisdiction analysis would be difficult in light of the lack of uniform 
collection and reporting. Nonetheless, these local systems demonstrate the 
feasibility of collecting and disseminating criminal justice data and could be 
adapted for use in the expanded, uniform reporting system proposed below.
An additional, somewhat more limited source of criminal justice 
information, potentially relevant to identifying incarceration for poverty, is 
state corrections agencies. Their records often include the type of offense with 
which each inmate has been charged—sometimes listing only the most serious 
offense as well as “the release date and whether the individual was released on 
parole.”168 In some cases these records are only available for inmates currently 
held,169 and are generally not electronically accessible in bulk.170
Finally, all states maintain criminal history repositories, but these often 
only include data on felonies and serious misdemeanors171 and are more 
helpful to background searches than to the type of criminal justice research 
that is the focus of this Article. 
2. The Federal Government
Some county- and state-specific criminal justice data is available as a 
result of data collection by federal entities. For example, the federal 
government collects certain consistent, uniform data on criminal cases through 
the BJS’s State Court Processing Statistics Program,172 which
tracks felony defendants from charging by the prosecutor until disposition of 
their cases (a maximum of 12 months for nonmurder cases and 24 months for 
murder cases). Data are obtained on demographic characteristics, arrest 
charges, criminal justice status at time of arrest, prior arrests and convictions, 
pretrial release and detention, court appearance record, rearrests while on 
pretrial release, type and outcome of adjudication, and type and length of 
sentence.173
But this data is collected only for the jurisdictions representing forty of the 
seventy-five largest counties, and only includes felonies—“[a]ny offense 
punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year”—and thus 
misses many of the more minor offenses.174 As Professor Alexandra Natapoff 
                                                                                                                     
168 SEARCH, supra note 143, at 25. 
169 Id.
170 Id. at 49.
171 Id. at 25–26.
172 Data Collection: State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS), supra note 15.
173 Id.
174 Felony Defendants, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid
=231 [https://perma.cc/T7WJ-75MZ].
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has shown, these minor offenses can have serious collateral consequences.175
Moreover, they can be a source of routine constitutional violations. Many 
individuals in jail are defendants held pretrial for nonviolent, nonfelony 
offenses.176 Examples of defendants charged with petty crimes, such as theft 
of goods from stores, and unable to pay small bail amounts, fines, and fees 
abound. National Public Radio documents the case of a man who tried to steal 
a television from Walmart while high on methamphetamine.177 He was unable 
to pay the $150 in bail set for his case, and, at the time of the story, had been 
in jail for seventy-five days; had lost his apartment, job, and truck and had 
been unable to pay child support.178 Similarly, the ACLU’s investigative 
report on debtors’ prisons documents a homeless man arrested for stealing 
food worth $39, fined $339, and jailed, and a worker fined $498 for possession 
of marijuana who was detained for five months for failure to pay a fine, among
many other stories involving nonfelony offenses.179 The State Court 
Processing Statistics Program omits these and thousands of other similar 
cases.180 Moreover, there is considerable delay in reporting; the latest data 
available is currently from 2009.181
The federal government also sometimes prepares special reports that 
compile and analyze the county, state, and federal district court data that it 
collects. For example, a BJS report based on 1990–2004 State Court 
Processing Statistics describes overall pretrial release rates, the percentage of 
defendants detained at different amounts of money bail, and different pretrial 
release rates for black, white, and Hispanic defendants and male and female 
defendants for different types of crimes, among other statistics.182 But this 
analysis does not compare these release rates among jurisdictions, thus failing 
to provide information about the counties, states, or federal district courts that 
might have the largest problems.
Some BJS data is state-specific. For example, through its Deaths in 
Custody Reporting Program, the BJS collects information from state prison 
and local jail death records and annual surveys, including, inter alia, the type 
                                                                                                                     
175 See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313 
(2012) (documenting the serious consequences of misdemeanors, which make up the “vast 
majority of U.S. convictions”). 
176 Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the National Symposium on Pretrial 
Justice, supra note 89.
177 Laura Sullivan, Bail Burden Keeps U.S. Jails Stuffed with Inmates, NPR (Jan. 21, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/01/21/122725771/Bail-Burden-Keeps-U-S-Jails-Stuffed-
With-Inmates [https://perma.cc/5RBK-R8ZY].
178 Id.
179 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 36, at 6.
180 See supra note 174–76 and accompanying text.
181 Data Collection: State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS), supra note 15 (noting 
that the latest data available is from 2009).
182 See, e.g., COHEN & REAVES, supra note 27, at 1–6. 
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and cause of the death, offense type, and time served.183 From this data it 
compiles reports that include, for example, prison and jail mortality rates by 
states; the percentages of deaths caused by particular conditions or actions, 
including suicide; and the average ages of inmates who died, among other data 
points.184 However, this data does not provide county-level details that could 
help identify the jurisdictions with the most problematic practices, and, as with 
the State Court Processing Statistics Data, is often several years old by the 
time analysis of the information is completed and released.185 The raw data 
behind the state-level statistics also is not readily available,186 thus making it 
more difficult for other researchers to run their own analyses. As a first step 
toward improving the availability of criminal justice data—a project discussed 
in more detail in Part III—BJS should anonymize its raw data and make it 
electronically available to the public, eliminating the need for researchers to 
request the data on a case-by-case basis and provide relatively detailed 
justifications for accessing the data.
The Bureau also supports states’ independent collection and statistical 
analysis of data through its Criminal Justice Data Improvement Program.187
As part of this initiative BJS funds state Statistical Analysis Centers (SACs), 
which “collect, analyze, and report statistics on crime and justice.”188 Recent 
SAC projects funded by BJS include, inter alia, an effort in Hawaii to 
automate certain information about supervised adult criminal defenders for 
easier compilation and statistical analysis189; an initiative in Minnesota to 
make “arrest, court, probation and correctional data” more publicly 
accessible190; and a study in certain New Mexico counties assessing the 
connection between pretrial detention and case processing times and the 
factors used in pretrial decisionmaking.191 Thus, data collection is improving, 
                                                                                                                     
183 MARGARET NOONAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248756, MORTALITY IN 
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but SACs and the BJS fail to provide a consistent, easily accessible source of 
raw jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction criminal data such as the number of defendants 
released pretrial; which defendants received appointed counsel, and when; and 
the number of defendants jailed for a failure to pay court fines or similar fees.
For federal criminal justice data, the BJS also compiles a Compendium of 
Federal Justice Statistics that details the number of suspects arrested for a 
federal offense, describes the types and rates of offenses at arrest (for example, 
46.3% of offenses in 2009 were immigration offenses)192, describes the 
percentage of arrests as allocated among judicial districts, outcomes of cases 
(plea, trial, or dismissal), sentence imposed, and mean prison terms, among 
other data.193 There is also a large database of uniform, relatively thorough 
information on federal case information that can be accessed through the 
PACER system, which includes case summaries, docket entries, and 
documents from federal district, bankruptcy, and appellate court cases, 
including criminal cases.194 Each night PACER collects “subsets of data” from 
all federal district courts through the PACER Case Locator, thus making the 
data available for searches.195 Entities searching for information can search by 
the “nature of suit,” thus allowing for more broad-based searches than searches 
that are limited to party name or case number.196
Although PACER allows some bulk searches, it is even more expensive 
than many of the commercial services options. PACER users who search for 
criminal case data must pay 10 cents per page downloaded197 in addition to the 
10 cents per page charged for a PACER search, although “[t]he charge for any 
single document is capped at $3, or 30 pages.”198 Account holders who do not 
accrue charges of more than $15.00 in a quarterly billing cycle do not owe 
PACER fees, although this fee exception is of limited use for bulk searches.199
                                                                                                                     
192 MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 234184, FEDERAL JUSTICE 
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“[N]ew case reports” and “non-case-specific reports or searches”—the types of 
searches most relevant for those seeking bulk data—are not subject to the $3 
or thirty-page cap,200 thus leading to potentially high charges for bulk 
searches. Further, although courts on a case-by-case basis may discretionarily 
waive PACER fees for nonprofit organizations, “individual researchers 
associated with educational institutions,” among other groups and 
individuals,201 those requesting an exemption must show that the “exemption 
is necessary in order to avoid unreasonable burdens and to promote public 
access to information,” and individual researchers must show that the “defined 
research project” is “limited in scope” and “is not intended for redistribution 
on the internet.”202 One recent Ninth Circuit order denying a nonprofit group’s
request “for unlimited access to all court documents for twelve months”
concluded that “[t]he amount of information sought is unprecedented in 
scope,” suggesting that large amounts of bulk data will be difficult to 
access.203 The Ninth Circuit also has held that an order denying a PACER 
user’s request for a fee exemption is not a decision “of a judicial character”
and is not appealable.204
The fact that PACER documents are free when viewed “at courthouse 
public access terminals”205 is also of little use to individuals and groups 
seeking bulk records, as illustrated by Internet activist Aaron Swartz’s attempt 
to download the entire database: in response, the government temporarily
halted the program and commenced an FBI investigation.206 These and other 
limitations lead groups like the Free Law Project to conclude that “the average 
member of the public has no meaningful access to federal court records.”207
Indeed, PACER and state and local court databases are primarily designed for 
attorneys and people looking for specific cases—not for individuals analyzing 
and coding bulk data to identify trends.
Finally, the Federal Sentencing Commission produces detailed monthly 
and quarterly reports on sentences submitted by all federal judges to the 
Commission, compiling cumulative data on within-recommended-range and 
out-of-range sentences, the primary offense and median sentence associated 
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with that offense, and other statistics.208 The Commission has also responded 
to demands for new types of information, increasing “[t]he types of data 
reported” based on specific data requests.209 Much of this data is summary 
data, however, and lacks the raw data needed for bulk analysis. 
3. Commercial Services
As described above, government collection and reporting of bulk criminal 
justice data is incomplete at best. However, one could imagine a service in 
which a private company sent individual employees to hundreds of 
courthouses, police departments, corrections departments, and clerks offices to 
collect and record extensive data from publicly accessible files; compiled this 
information, and made this information accessible (for a fee) in a uniform, 
searchable format that allowed for the type of extensive statistical analysis 
typical of the big data movement. Indeed, there are numerous commercial 
services that do this very task, such as LexisNexis Risk Solutions210 and US 
Investigations Services, LLC (formerly a government agency, now 
privatized),211 among many others.212 Commercial criminal justice data 
companies, like any individual searching for information, still must work with 
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government officials to obtain this information.213 But because these 
companies’ mission is to collect data, they are more likely to be familiar with 
the procedures for collecting the information, and thus more efficient at the 
collection effort.214 Further, they have the resources to purchase bulk data in 
the courts and other institutions that allow these types of purchases.215
Despite the potential for commercial services to collect and provide—for a 
price—data from across jurisdictions, the types of information are limited by 
the market for them, or lack thereof. Some of the most common information 
collected and provided is for the purposes of background searches by 
employment agencies and other organizations.216 This data includes, for 
example, information on “the arrest (or notice to appear in lieu of arrest); 
detention; indictment or other formal criminal charge (and any conviction, 
acquittal, or other disposition arising therefrom); sentencing; correctional 
supervision; or release.”217 Some of this data could assist criminal justice 
reform efforts by, for example, indicating whether the charge related to a 
failure to pay a probation fee and whether the individual was sentenced to 
imprisonment for this failure to pay. But because the data tends to be focused 
on understanding an individual’s criminal justice record, it lacks information 
such as the time between arrest and appointment of counsel and the length of 
pretrial detention. 
In addition to not collecting many of the types of criminal justice 
information most valuable to scholars, policymakers, and reform groups, 
commercial services that collect and digitize thousands of court and police 
records also charge fees that make this information inaccessible to these 
groups absent a generous grant or other funding.218 For example, KnowX—
part of Lexis’s service—charges $9.95 per background check or $25.00 for an 
“[a]dvanced” check.219 Searchers can also obtain a day-pass for $24.95220 or a 
thirty-day pass with unlimited background searches for $99.95.221 There are 
millions of criminal defendants in the United States,222 and even if the 
background check data most frequently collected by commercial services had 
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the data points most critical to revealing problems in priority areas, data 
collection through this method could be cost prohibitive. Conceivably, 
however, commercial data collection services could be induced to provide 
anonymized (and thus valueless to their principal customers) bulk data to 
researchers at a reduced cost. In the absence of a more comprehensive 
solution, this is an avenue worth exploring.
Considered collectively, the criminal justice data available is surprisingly 
limited or expensive to access. A few states, like New York223 and 
Pennsylvania,224 have begun to collect more detailed data, to ensure that the 
data is consistent across municipalities and counties in the state, and to make 
this data more accessible. Further, in the many cases where courts are not 
providing adequate information, some enterprising companies are digging up 
this information themselves, traveling to courtrooms around the country and 
digitizing records.225 One might expect that a variety of incentives would push 
courts and companies to collect more of this information and at least provide it 
for a fee, using the money to fund much-needed court services and staff or to 
simply produce profits for a company. But the nature of the information 
prevents the formation of strong markets in this area, as discussed below.226
B. Inadequate Incentives for Data Production
Given the huge volume of data now electronically available, it is perhaps 
surprising that we still do not know how many courthouses in how many 
counties and states deny the public access to the courtroom,227 fail to ask a 
defendant whether he or she is indigent and therefore needs counsel,228 apply 
bail schedules that cause the automatic detention of numerous defendants,229
or jail defendants who are unable to pay parole fees or child support.230 One 
might expect, that even if this information is not currently systemically 
collected and reported, someone would be likely to step in to fill this gap. But 
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this information—while it could be, and sometimes is231—transformed into a 
marketable good—lacks a significant market. And this barrier is compounded 
by strong resistance from many county and state courthouses to the prospect of 
digitizing and widely disseminating information that could reveal negative 
characteristics of their criminal justice systems. 
1. A Public Good Without a Market Solution
Data about the millions of defendants who annually encounter some part 
of the local, state, or federal criminal justice system on an annual basis, which 
is a public good, encounters market failures that have long been associated 
with information production and dissemination more generally.232 As many 
copyright owners have discovered in the digital age, if information is produced 
and disseminated, it is difficult to prevent others from accessing and 
benefitting from this data.233 Thus, electronically accessible criminal justice 
data is a classic nonrival public good for which no user has incentive to pay, 
and which suffers from chronic underproduction.234 In many contexts, this 
problem has been overcome by rapidly declining costs of information 
production and dissemination,235 but many courts still view data production as 
costly.
Even when information gathering remains costly, firms can maintain 
demand by restricting access. Westlaw and LexisNexis, for example, are able 
to charge significant fees for access to their databases (although judicial 
opinions are increasingly becoming available for free online)236, because bulk 
downloads are not permitted. However, in order for firms to be incentivized to 
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collect and digitize the information, and put up access barriers, there must be a 
demand for the data itself. For instance, the number of background checks, 
conducted by public and private employers has grown substantially in recent 
years,237 creating a profitable market for firms like KnowX.238 But the type of 
information needed for criminal justice reform, such as who is detained 
pretrial and why, how many indigent defendants are denied counsel and at 
what stage, and the number and types of defendants jailed due to a failure to 
pay criminal fees, lacks a similar market. Rather, this data is demanded by a 
small, select group of scholars and reformers, many of whom lack the 
resources to pay hefty fees for the thousands of data points needed to produce 
good empirical information in this area.239 Indeed, their work itself is a species 
of often-underproduced public good. The lack of commercial demand for the 
information, and relatively low ability to pay on the part of those who could 
benefit from the information, causes the market not to provide it.
As seen above, governments also largely fail to provide access to these 
sorts of data as well,240 albeit for different reasons. Inertia, no doubt, plays a 
part. So, too, do concerns about defendants’ privacy. Indeed, some state 
policies expressly prohibit courts’ dissemination of electronic data, or disallow 
bulk data searches of court data, out of concern that individuals and 
commercial services will use the information for illicit purposes, although, as 
described below, these concerns can be addressed by stripping bulk data of 
identifying information.241 Less laudably, it may be that some courts resist 
providing broader access to their information because of the rent payments
generated by charging for it. For example, federal courts have used the fees 
from PACER for projects such as providing flatscreen monitors for each 
individual juror in certain courtrooms and embedding speakers within 
courtroom benches and panels to enhance courtroom audio.242 Further, in 
some cases, courts must do more than simply make their electronic courthouse 
data available more broadly (with privacy protections). As with many 
information systems, courts have long followed particular practices when it 
                                                                                                                     
237 See Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy
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comes to collecting information,243 and asking them to collect new types of 
information and make it available in an anonymized, uniform manner creates 
costs and coordination problems. Thus, lingering costs to information 
production—whether real or perceived—contribute to an ongoing information 
failure in the criminal justice context. But state and local courts’ resistance to 
calls to produce more and more uniform data may also stem from a desire to 
avoid unwanted scrutiny or oversight.
2. Local Opposition to Data Collection and Disclosure
Some state and local governments may oppose any effort that supports 
detailed analysis—research that could expose pathologies within certain 
jurisdictions’ criminal justice systems, such as systemic denial of counsel to 
indigent defendants. While some governments may welcome the opportunity 
to identify and correct problems, others may be wary of increased exposure to 
criticism and litigation. For governments violating well-established rights, 
exposure can lead to rapid change. For example, in a case initiated by Equal 
Justice Under Law attorneys, a U.S. district court in Alabama noted that the 
City of Clanton, Alabama “utilized a generic bail schedule for new 
misdemeanor arrests, a schedule from which it did not deviate: $500 per 
charge (and $1,000 per DUI charge),” and required “payment upfront,” thus 
causing those unable to pay to be held in jail until the next court date.244
However, City officials revised their bail policies before the court issued its 
opinion.245 The officials also hastily implemented a policy allowing public 
access to the city’s municipal courtroom246 in response to allegations that it 
regularly denied access.247 Similarly, in Williamson County, Texas, after 
plaintiffs alleged that the County denied open access to its courtrooms and 
regularly failed to provide counsel to indigent defendants,248 the County 
purported to change its policies in an unsuccessful attempt to have the case 
dismissed as moot.249
Many state and county courts are also likely to view federal data collection 
as yet another intrusion into their criminal justice systems and a threat to 
comity.250 Indeed, this might explain, in part, why only relatively few states 
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have signed on to some of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s numerous 
initiatives encouraging uniform data entry for crime incidents, crime histories, 
and other data.251 Although more than 6,000 local, state, and tribal agencies 
participate in the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS)—a law 
enforcement system with detailed data about crimes and the characteristics of 
individuals committing the crime252—only fifteen states directly input crime 
incidents into the system, and an additional eighteen states have systems that 
are certified by NIBRS and compatible with it.253 As shown by congressional 
efforts to force more uniform data collection and reporting, such as 
information on individuals not licensed to carry firearms, the federal 
government often must cajole state and local governments to cooperate by 
expanding the grant money offered to them.254
The criminal justice system is a black, or at least gray, box because of a 
variety of disincentives for its production and dissemination, ranging from 
information failures255 to local and state resistance to efforts toward uniform 
collection and electronic dissemination of data.256 Certain local governments 
and states, however, have begun to generate and make available the types of 
information that are needed to pinpoint the parts of the criminal justice system 
most in need of reform, and to identify the jurisdictions with the largest 
problems.257 The following Part suggests ways of improving information 
production and access.
IV. CLOSING THE DATA GAP
Criminal justice data is far behind other fields in terms of the availability 
of uniform, electronic data for sophisticated analysis. As Professor Daniel Esty 
noted in the environmental context in 2004—when electronic monitoring and 
collection of pollution data was already rapidly expanding—areas with 
particularly broad information gaps often require a centralized solution for the 
purposes of enhancing efficiency, improving economies of scale, and 
mediating inconsistencies among potential data gathering systems.258 This 
centralized entity need not always collect information—indeed, sometimes 
smaller-scale collection, provided that it is coordinated by a centralized entity, 
                                                                                                                     
251 See infra Part IV. 
252 UNIF. CRIME REPORTING (UCR) PROGRAM, NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING 
SYSTEM (NIBRS), NIBRS PARTICIPATION BY STATE (2013), 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/2013/resources/nibrs-participation-by-state [https://perma.cc/65X8
-GVUK].
253 Id.
254 See infra note 287 and accompanying text. 
255 See Gibson, supra note 232, at 172–74.
256 See generally Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15cv34–MHT, 2015 WL 5387219 
(M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015).
257 See State Profiles, supra note 189.
258 Esty, supra note 8, at 143–44.
2017] CRIMINAL JUSTICE BLACK BOX 391
is the least expensive option.259 But the federal government is best situated to 
create a uniform system for data collection and reporting, regardless of 
whether private entities, states, local governments, or federal agencies collect 
the information.
A. Improved Data Collection System
As described above, some states have already unified their information 
collection systems for criminal defendants and their interactions with the 
criminal justice system, ensuring that all municipal and county courts provide 
basic electronic data about defendant demographics, criminal history, arrest, 
types and numbers of charges, and case dispositions.260 These states also 
provide information on how to uniformly input data and correct incorrect data, 
and they conduct analyses to determine whether data is in fact being inputted 
correctly across jurisdictions.261 Additionally, some counties and states 
provide detailed docket information and case summaries that contain certain 
data on defendant demographics, charges, appointment of counsel, case 
disposition, and sentences, but the data collected and made available varies 
widely.262 Individual courts are similarly varied, with the most closed courts 
providing no electronically accessible information and thus requiring on-site 
data collection.263 The federal government, as described above, collects 
detailed information about felony defendants from forty of the largest seventy-
five counties, although this data is from limited time periods within each data 
year, it does not include certain important pretrial information, and researchers 
need permission to access it.264 The federal government also has conducted 
periodic surveys of obstacles to effective indigent defense, describing the 
counties with the highest caseloads, for example, and generalized data about a 
lack of adequate access to investigative resources.265 But this data, too, lacks 
specifics on the percentages of indigent defendants denied counsel and why. In 
sum, despite the enormous advances in information technology made over the 
last few decades, much criminal justice data remains difficult to access, if it 
exists at all. Modest changes could produce significant benefits. BJS and New 
York, for example, could make anonymized versions of their databases 
available to the public, and PACER’s fee structure and search features could 
be improved.266 And as noted above, providers of background checks might be 
willing to allow researchers access to a version of their databases with 
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identifying information removed.267 But a more comprehensive solution would 
have even greater potential to aid research and reform efforts.
This Part accordingly proposes that the federal government provide an 
electronic platform through which counties and states would input data for 
each defendant, including: 1) demographic data such as gender, race, age, and 
individual characteristics identified during a bail hearing, such as income and 
community ties; 2) arrest and arraignment dates and date of the charge; 3) date 
on which counsel was appointed, and reasons for a failure to appoint counsel if 
no counsel was appointed; 4) date of the bail hearing; 5) pretrial detention, 
bail, or pretrial release imposed, including conditions associated with release; 
6) whether or not the defendant appeared for trial or committed pretrial crimes; 
7) date of case disposition and type of adjudication, including a plea, 
conviction, diversion, or determination of not guilty; 8) the sentence imposed; 
9) and parole conditions imposed. For states like New York and Pennsylvania 
that already have unified electronic databases,268 the federal government could 
set uniform standards for data coding and anonymizing, allowing the 
incorporation of those databases without duplication of effort. This data would 
allow reformers, judges, police, policymakers, and researchers to identify how 
long defendants sit in jail or are subjected to electronic monitoring or other 
conditions while awaiting trial; the jurisdictions that appoint counsel too late 
in a case (or never), and how often this happens; and the types of charges that 
lead to imprisonment, including charges associated with a failure to pay court 
fines and other monetary obligations. It may be that other, similar types of 
information would be useful; this Article targets the basic data necessary to 
inform the three criminal justice efforts introduced in Part I, but additional 
data points are possible. 
County, state, and federal courts—which already collect much of this data, 
albeit not uniformly or consistently—are the logical entities to input this data 
and provide it to a centralized database, similar to the unified approach that 
New York uses for its county and municipal courts.269 This database should 
have uniform data input fields containing the information identified above, and 
individual courts’ data entries should be directly linked electronically to this 
database, thus allowing automated transfer of data inputs from individual 
courts to the centralized database. Also drawing from the New York approach, 
there should be uniform rules for inputting data—such as inputting dates in the 
same format—and for correcting data.270 A computer program should also 
scan the data and flag anomalies, such as the data of case disposition being 
earlier than the date of arraignment. To protect defendants’ privacy, all names, 
addresses, social security and driver’s license numbers, telephone numbers, 
and other personal identifying characteristics should be omitted from the 
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database—similar to the system already followed in states like Idaho.271
Further, the public should have free, open access to this database without 
having to request access and provide documentation of institutional approval 
for the research.272
A comprehensive database is a lofty goal, but, once its architecture is in 
place, it could be built incrementally as states and local governments choose to 
opt in; even a partial database would be of considerable value. Similarly, even 
without federal participation or standardization, states can, with varying 
degrees of effort, make their own data significantly more accessible, a 
worthwhile endeavor in itself.
B. Federal Involvement 
The process of persuading county and state courts to record the same types 
of data, and in the same format, will be a complex task. The logical entity for 
overcoming the high coordination and resource-based hurdles to this effort is 
the federal government—and particularly the Bureau of Justice Statistics—
which already collects some of this data through surveys.273
Federal leadership in creating and maintaining the criminal justice 
database proposed here will be necessary for reasons of political economy and 
the collective-action challenges identified in Part II.B. The federal government 
could offer incentives to persuade subfederal entities to agree to these 
perceived intrusions, such as providing enhanced funding for police forces or 
other criminal justice efforts for those jurisdictions that agree to provide data 
in uniform ways. Indeed, the government in the past has offered incentive 
funding to states that provide information about individuals ineligible to 
purchase guns and that improve and share their criminal justice data.274
Further, because the BJS already collects local and state data through surveys, 
the use of an automated information collection system might reduce burdens 
on state and local governments, eliminating the need to systematically collect 
and report data for these surveys.
Federal intervention in collecting data is also important to create 
uniformity. A wholly bottom-up effort, in which thousands of court systems 
developed their own collection and reporting efforts would—while still an 
improvement over the status quo—make cross-jurisdiction analysis difficult, if 
not impossible. Although a federal lead is necessary to overcome these 
problems, state and local input will also be important to incentivize more 
subfederal jurisdictions to participate in the database. The BJS or a similar 
federal agency that formulates the database and works with state and local 
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governments to obtain information for the database should examine current 
subfederal data collection practices identified in Part I of this Article and 
conform the database as closely as possible to these existing practices. The 
more that a federal database matched existing subfederal practices, the more 
likely that states, counties, and other local governments would be to provide 
information; this would also substantially reduce burdens on those 
jurisdictions that chose to participate in the database.
The federal government has a long history of coordinating state criminal 
justice information collection efforts,275 and its expertise and superior 
resources in this area could be leveraged to create the criminal justice database 
proposed here. The government has historically formed federal databases that 
collected state-based criminal information (particularly arrest and other 
criminal history information),276 examined existing state data collection efforts 
to determine how national databases could best harness information from 
states,277 and required uniform state reporting and linkages of state data with 
federal databases.278
In one example of an extensive federal data collection effort in the 
criminal context, the Brady Act of 1993 directed the Attorney General to 
create a National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS),279
which firearms importers, dealers, and licensees were required to search before 
transferring a firearm to an unlicensed person.280 Congress directed the federal 
government to investigate existing state criminal records systems to determine 
how quickly states would likely be able to provide data to a national on-line 
system.281 Further, Congress required the Attorney General to develop the 
necessary computer system to link state criminal history background checks 
with the federal NICS, thus allowing for automated transfer of data between 
the two systems.282
As originally formed, NICS did not provide the FBI with “automated 
access to complete information from the States” regarding individual 
possession of firearms, and “millions of criminal records” lacked “critical data, 
such as arrest dispositions, due to data backlogs.”283 Congress identified the 
primary obstacles to this data effort as arising from the states, including 
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inadequate updates and availability of state records and a lack of automated 
access to many of these records.284 It accordingly recommended that states 
make the data federally available in a more “usable” format and computerize 
and automate their records with the assistance of the federal government.285
Congress incentivized states to make their records on firearm possession 
eligibility electronically accessible,286 promising that states would not have to 
provide any matching funding of federal money already provided for these 
types of efforts.287 To receive this incentive, states also were required to 
update their records when certain criteria on firearm possession ineligibility 
expired, thus ensuring that state data was up-to-date and uniform.288
Another example of federal involvement in state information collection 
and electronic reporting is the FBI’s Interstate Identification Index (III), which 
contains criminal information on individuals, and in which all states 
participate.289 The index includes identification information such as “name, 
birth date, race and gender” for all “persons arrested for fingerprintable [state 
or federal] felonies and misdemeanors.”290 Further, the FBI maintains a 
centralized database of state and federal data designed to help “criminal justice 
professionals apprehend fugitives, locate missing persons, recover stolen 
property, and identify terrorists.”291 This National Crime Information Center 
database includes numerous electronic records, from those in the National Sex 
Offender Registry to missing persons, suspected terrorists, and identity theft 
cases.292
At the law enforcement level, many states also have agreed to a uniform 
data reporting system organized by the federal government.293 Through the 
NIBRS, more than 6,000 local, state, tribal, and federal agencies report crime 
data into the system,294 including data such as “assaults on law enforcement 
officers, offenses in which weapons were involved, drug/narcotic offenses, 
hate crimes, domestic and familial abuse including elder abuse, juvenile crime, 
gang-related crime, parental abduction, organized crime, and pornography, as 
well as arrest data related to driving under the influence.”295 Agencies also 
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enter offender-specific information such as drug and alcohol use “before the 
incident and whether the offender used computer equipment to perpetrate the 
crime.”296 States can directly input information into the national database or 
into a state program that is certified as meeting the federal standards.297 The 
federal government ensures uniform data input by carefully defining twenty-
three offense categories containing forty-nine “specific crimes,” and all 
individualized systems that participate in NIBRS are automated.298
These and other efforts to collect and synthesize state criminal history 
information have involved extensive work by the federal government to make 
state reporting more consistent, most of which is funded, directed, or 
administered by the BJS, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and an information-
based division of the FBI. For example, these bureaus have supported uniform 
development of local and state records management systems maintained by 
law enforcement, recommending standard practices such as automatic 
submittal of data to external sources, use of codes whenever possible, and 
validation of data entry for each data field included.299 The BJS also provides 
annual grants to states and local governments to “improve the quality, 
timeliness, and immediate accessibility of criminal history records and related 
information” and to integrate and link information from all components of the 
criminal justice system, such as prosecutorial, police, court, and jail and prison 
records.300 BJS also worked with the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information 
Services Division and a nonprofit organization of states to develop voluntary 
performance standards for improving state criminal history repositories and to 
make them more uniform.301
The costs to state and local governments associated with updating their 
information collection and reporting efforts and unifying these efforts could 
also be supported by federal funds. A good deal of federal criminal 
information-related funding currently supports improved and more uniform 
data for criminal background checks.302 Although this data is important for 
crime prevention, gun control, and other efforts, the government has recently 
expanded its attention to systemic criminal justice problems, particularly 
                                                                                                                     
296 Id.
297 UNIF. CRIME REPORTING (UCR) PROGRAM, NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING 
SYSTEM (NIBRS), METHODOLOGY (2013), https://fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/2013/reso
urces/methodology [https://perma.cc/EN6U-D974].
298 Id.
299 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE & NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 277, at 1.
300 National Criminal History Improvement Program, BUREAU JUST. STAT.,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=47 [https://perma.cc/Y2LY-37R3].
301 State Repository Records & Reporting Quality Assurance Program (QAP),
SEARCH, http://www.search.org/solutions/criminal-history-records/state-repository-record
s-and-reporting-quality-assurance-program-qap/ [https://perma.cc/6MPM-8P6D].
302 See, e.g., State Profiles, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp
&tid=491#promising [https://perma.cc/PL5G-U7GM] (showing awards for improving state 
record reporting for the National Instant Criminal Background Check System as increasing 
from a total of $2,506,731 in 2009 to $22,695,054 in 2015). 
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through its funding of state SACs, which “collect, analyze, and report statistics 
on crime and justice.”303 Not all of this funding, which is provided to the 
SACs as part of the Criminal Justice Data Improvement Program,304 supports 
the type of data needed for criminal justice reform,305 but some does. For 
example, as introduced above, two recent grants support an effort in
Minnesota to make “arrest, court, probation and correctional data” more 
publicly accessible and useable; and a study in certain New Mexico counties 
assessing the connection between pretrial detention and case processing times 
and the factors used in pretrial decisionmaking.306 Some additional shifting of 
funds to the criminal justice database might be merited, and recent grants show 
that the government is already moving in this direction. Indeed, the federal 
government recently announced a “Big Data” initiative that provides funds to 
agencies like the Department of Energy and National Institute of Health to 
improve data collection and analytics.307 This program could be expanded to
help support the BJS’s similar efforts to assist state and local government data 
collection and analysis in the criminal justice area.
These and other examples from the criminal history context show that the 
federal government has an extensive array of tools and experience in the field 
of incentivizing state and local information collection and sharing. An effort to 
create a national database of criminal justice information containing limited 
data such as arrest date, appointment of counsel, and pretrial hearings could 
build from the lessons learned from efforts in the criminal history context. The 
fact that states already have a nonprofit organization that works with the 
federal government and negotiates the uniformity and sharing of state and 
local criminal data308 will also greatly aid this effort, preventing the need to 
form new organizations for this task. Nonetheless, a broad-based reform of the 
way criminal justice information is collected and shared is a significant 
undertaking, and, as with any proposal for a new government program, cost is 
a concern. So, too, is privacy: disseminating unredacted data could be 
extremely damaging to both convicted and unconvicted defendants. These 
objections are considered in the following Part.
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V. OBJECTIONS
Beyond state and local governments’ predictable resistance to further 
federal demands for data provision, a variety of objections to the federal 
criminal justice database are likely. The strongest resistance will likely arise 
from concerns about the resources required of states and local governments 
that already struggle to make ends meet. Further, similar to privacy concerns 
that have already arisen from private and public entities’ growing use of 
criminal histories, there will be objections to further collecting, categorizing, 
and disseminating information about pretrial decisions, case disposition, 
sentencing, and other aspects of criminal defendants’ cases. Neither of these 
objections, however, appears to outweigh the potentially extensive benefits of 
improving access to this criminal justice information. 
A. Costs
Because state and local governments, federal agencies, and courts already 
collect some of the information that would be included in a criminal justice 
database, updating existing systems to link with a federal database would not 
be as expensive as creating a new system from whole cloth. Many state and 
local governments produce and record information such as the date on which 
counsel was appointed, the date of the pretrial hearing, and case disposition. 
Some also collect basic demographic data for each defendant, such as race and 
income.309 Although data inputs would have to be made uniform, and in some 
cases governments would have to change and expand the type of data that they 
record for each defendant, this need not be a herculean task, at least for 
jurisdictions already electronically inputting data.
Indeed, the database proposed in this Article could, and likely should, be 
implemented incrementally. The federal database manager could first 
collaborate with states like New York that already collect uniform information 
from county and municipal courts.310 The manager could work with the states 
to update these state systems and link them with the national database. Further, 
the manager and initial participating states could identify the most challenging 
aspects of this effort, such as rates of data input errors—particularly for new 
categories of information that state and local governments did not previously 
record—before expanding the database to other jurisdictions. These lessons 
learned could make expansion to additional states more efficient. The database 
would, of course, be most useful if all jurisdictions participated. But the dearth 
of existing uniform, accessible data is so stark that any improvements—even 
the initial inclusion of just two states within the database, for example—could 
support important analytical efforts to identify needed criminal justice reforms 
or support existing reform efforts.
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B. Privacy Intrusions
An additional objection to the uniform, consistent, and widespread 
availability of criminal justice information is privacy—a concern already 
raised by the many courts that have rules prohibiting electronic access to data 
or bulk searches of that data.311 These courts worry that full electronic access 
will allow identity theft; encourage more crime against particular, targeted 
individuals; and compromise individuals’ privacy,312 among other problems.
States like Idaho have recognized that these concerns can be relatively 
easily solved by omitting certain information from public records.313 This 
effort is somewhat costly, as it requires removal of data that is included within 
case summaries and dockets. For example, a committee appointed to examine 
public access to court records in Maryland noted that “court records consist of 
case docket sheets, which contain information identifying the parties (name, 
address, and in criminal cases date of birth, height, weight, sex and race) and 
describing case events (such as filing and disposition).”314 The courts must 
continue to collect this information for their own purposes, but automated 
programs that eliminated personal information before making the data 
electronically accessible to the public would reduce the cost of the data 
redaction or removal effort. Further, just as states like New York have an 
automated program to search for errors and anomalies in electronic records,315
as a back up to automated removal of personal information courts could run a 
similar program to double check records for privacy purposes. 
Thus, while there are legitimate concerns about broadly distributing basic 
case summary and docket data from criminal cases, there are reasonable 
responses to these concerns. Just as technology makes it possible to more 
easily record and disseminate data that will inform criminal justice reform 
efforts in important ways, technology also enables the exclusion of certain data 
that should not be distributed to the public.316
VI. CONCLUSION
Information alone cannot promise meaningful change in the criminal 
justice system. Even the most thorough data will not guarantee a successful 
court challenge, particularly in areas like Equal Protection challenges where 
discriminatory intent must be shown in addition to discriminatory effects.317
Nor will better information necessarily cause nonprofit and governmental 
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groups to target the areas of the criminal justice system that seem to demand 
the most attention. These groups respond to a variety of signals, including 
personal experiences of their staff, anecdotal evidence from the areas of the 
country in which these groups typically work, and the priorities of the largest 
donors—preferences that might also be shaped by personal experience and 
anecdotes.318 These perceptions are durable, and empirical evidence pointing 
to areas where the greatest injustices occur will not immediately cause 
foundations and other nonprofit groups working in the criminal justice area to 
change course.319 Further, statistical data pointing to jurisdictions that 
systematically, egregiously violate the basic rights of criminal defendants by 
failing to appoint counsel for indigent defendants or holding defendants 
pretrial for extended periods of time is not guaranteed to sway policymakers.
Local officials, in particular, might be more likely to dig in their heels and 
become defensive in response to proof that certain aspects of their criminal 
justice system lags behind others.
Despite the limits of empirical data, some recent examples show the 
potential for broadly accessible uniform data to effect substantial change. The 
imprisonment of millions of individuals under harsh crack cocaine sentences 
led to a gradual recognition of largely unsupported variations in sentencing 
and to sentencing reforms.320 Even more recently, the rise of digital videos 
produced from handheld smart phones has called attention to injustices during 
the arrest movement and has helped spur the Black Lives Matter movement.321
And where groups have been able to collect detailed information about routine 
problems in the criminal justice system by sending staff to regularly sit in 
courtrooms at pretrial hearings,322 or by conducting extensive surveys of 
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practices within limited geographic areas,323 they have tended to succeed in 
obtaining change through the courts.324
Big data in the criminal justice context will likely have the most potential 
when used to identify problems in the criminal justice system that have not yet 
been fully documented. For example, although the right to counsel for indigent 
defendants was solidified in 1963, inadequate access to counsel remains a 
massive problem.325 And although this problem has been documented by 
numerous studies providing estimates of underfunding and other 
representation problems, solid, empirical data could provide information on 
the localities and states that pose the largest problem and should be the targets 
of reform. Similar data is also critical to revealing systemic problems, and 
jurisdiction-specific failures, in the contexts of bail and debtors’ prisons, 
among other contexts.
Given the realities of our criminal justice system—consisting of thousands 
of largely autonomous and heterogeneous jurisdictions—bringing criminal 
justice data collection into the twenty-first century will not be an easy task, but 
neither is it an insuperably difficult one. But given the potential payoffs from 
even incremental steps towards that goal, both in facilitating broad-level 
research and identifying problems at the local level, it is one worth pursuing.
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